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INTRODUCTION
In United States v. Haggar Apparel Company,1 the Supreme Court
mandated Chevron analysis2 for judicial review of a regulation issued
by the United States Customs Service (“Customs Service”) relating to
the tariff classification of imported goods.3 The Court carefully
1. 526 U.S. 380, 383 (1999).
2. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984) (sustaining a regulation of the Environmental Protection Agency interpreting
an ambiguous provision of the Clean Air Act). In Chevron, “one of the most
important decisions in the history of administrative law,” 1 KENNETH CULP DAVIS &
RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 110 (3d ed. 1994), “[t]he Court
created a new two-step test [known as Chevron analysis] to be applied to all attempts
by agencies to give meaning to the statutes they administer.” Id. at 109; see also infra
Part II and accompanying text (discussing doctrinal foundations of Chevron). While
the Chevron standard is sometimes referred to as “Chevron deference,” this Article
prefers the term “Chevron analysis” to emphasize that Chevron sets out a two-step
method in which the court, in step one, makes an independent determination of
whether the statute is silent or ambiguous. See id. at 112 (quoting the first step of
Chevron analysis); see also infra notes 10-16 and accompanying text (discussing Chevron
analysis).
3. Imported goods are assigned a “tariff classification,” one of approximately
10,000 product descriptions in the U.S. tariff statute. The classification is one of the
elements of assessing customs duties on imported goods; the rate of duty of an
imported good corresponds to its product description. See generally 1 EUGENE T.
ROSSIDES & ALEXANDRA M ARAVEL, UNITED STATES IMPORT TRADE LAW ch. 11 (1998)
(discussing the history, process, and law of tariff classification); see also infra notes
260-62 and accompanying text. In addition to classification, valuation (the
determination of the value of the imported goods for customs purposes) is an
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crafted its opinion in Haggar to state a narrow holding, and as a result
the decision leaves important and difficult questions open.4 The
open questions require a comprehensive reconciliation between a
presumption under Chevron that “the law places in the
[administrative] agency, to some extent, the responsibility to say what
the statute means”5 and an unusual institutional framework in which
Congress directed a specialized federal court to conduct de novo
judicial review,6 a power that seemingly “requires the court’s
independent determination of the matter at issue.”7
This
reconciliation, in turn, has important implications for understanding
Chevron analysis in general.8 It also raises questions about our
understanding of the allocation of responsibilities and powers
between agencies and courts in the modern administrative state.9
This Article explores these questions and proposes a reconciliation of
element of assessing customs duties; the rates of duties are generally expressed on an
ad valorem basis (i.e. as a percentage of the value of the imported goods). See generally
id. ch. 12 (explaining various formulas for valuing imports and summarizing the
history of the current U.S. valuation system).
4. See infra notes 102-25 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme
Court’s decision in Haggar). The Supreme Court has already recognized the
importance of the issues not addressed in Haggar by granting certiorari in a
subsequent customs case presenting the very questions that remained open. See
Mead Corp. v. United States, 185 F.3d 1304 (Fed. Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct.
2193 (2000).
For further discussion of Mead, see infra notes 349-78 and
accompanying text.
5. PETER L. STRAUSS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ADMINISTRATIVE J USTICE IN THE UNITED
STATES 255 (1989).
6. See 28 U.S.C. § 2640(a)(1) (1994) (providing de novo review of the denial of a
protest by the Customs Service). The protest against Customs Service decisions
under section 514 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1514, is “the basic right of
review granted by the Tariff Act of 1930. . . .” 1 ROSSIDES & MARAVEL, supra note 3, at
17-2. “A protest is a request to Customs for it to change its decision,” and “if Customs
denies the protest [under section 515 of the Tariff Act, 19 U.S.C. § 1515], the law
provides for judicial review of that denial.” Id. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a), the CIT
has exclusive jurisdiction to review the denial of a protest under section 515 of the
Tariff Act. Section 1581(a) lawsuits challenging denials of protests are the principal
method of obtaining judicial review of Customs Service actions and account for a
large majority of customs litigation in the CIT. The controversy over the use of
Chevron analysis in customs litigation has arisen in the context of section 1581(a)
cases, which are governed by the de novo standard of review set out in 28 U.S.C.
§ 2640(a)(1).
7. STRAUSS, supra note 5, at 245.
8. See infra Part II (reexamining the theoretical justifications for Chevron analysis
in an effort to gain greater insights into its use in de novo judicial review).
9. Cf. Proceedings of the Eleventh Judicial Conference of the United States Court of
International Trade (Dec. 7, 1999) (comments of Peter L. Strauss) (transcript on file
with authors) [hereinafter Eleventh USCIT Judicial Conference]
(“What I would like you to think about, instead of the idea of deference, is
the idea of allocation, that what Chevron is about is defining those
circumstances in which the court is to regard itself as acting on its own and
those circumstances in which the court is to regard itself as acting as an
umpire or referee . . . .”).
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the apparently contradictory concepts of Chevron analysis and de novo
review.
Chevron sets out a two-step method of analysis for judicial review of
an administrative agency’s interpretation of a statute it administers.10
First, the court uses traditional tools of statutory interpretation to
determine independently whether or not Congress has spoken to the
precise statutory interpretation question at issue.11 If congressional
intent is clear, the court enforces that intent regardless of the
agency’s interpretation of the statute.12 But if the court determines
that Congress has not spoken to the precise issue, leaving the statute
silent or ambiguous, the court turns to the second step of Chevron
analysis.13 Under the second step, the court assesses whether the
agency’s interpretation is permissible and reasonable.14 When the
agency’s interpretation is reasonable, the reviewing court will not
substitute its own interpretation for the agency’s.15 Instead, step two
requires the court to accept, or “defer to,” a reasonable
interpretation of an ambiguous statutory provision by the agency that
administers the statute.16
The two-step Chevron analysis can be contrasted to a similar but
distinct doctrine known as Skidmore deference.17 Under Skidmore, a
court gives potentially great weight to the agency’s interpretation
after assessing its persuasiveness and reasonableness.18 Skidmore is a
one-step method in which the court makes its own, independent
interpretation of the statute, but in doing so considers the agency’s
interpretation along with other tools of statutory interpretation.19
Chevron, in contrast, prescribes a two-step method in which the
agency, and not the court, makes the controlling interpretation of
the statute where the court finds that the two preconditions for
deference to the agency’s interpretation are present.20
10. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43 (outlining the “two questions” confronting the
reviewing court).
11. See id. at 842.
12. See id. at 842-43.
13. See id. at 843.
14. See id.
15. See id. at 844.
16. See id. at 845.
17. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (finding that
administrators’ rulings constituted a “body of experience and informed judgment to
which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance”).
18. Under Skidmore, “[t]he weight [accorded to the agency’s interpretation] in a
particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the
validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and
all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.” Id.
19. See id. at 137, 140.
20. Professor Robert Anthony emphasizes the distinction between Chevron and
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Chevron analysis is established in most areas of administrative law.21
Nevertheless, its application to customs law in Haggar was a novel
question.22 Unlike most areas of administrative law, judicial review of
Customs Service decisions is not conducted by federal courts of
general jurisdiction.23 Instead, it is conducted by the United States
Court of International Trade (CIT)24 and, on appeal, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC).25 The CIT is
a specialized federal court that is statutorily charged with exercising
de novo review in customs litigation.26 In fact, it is the direct successor
to an administrative tribunal formerly within the Department of the
Treasury and combines the powers and duties of that tribunal with

Skidmore by using the terms “Chevron acceptance” and “Skidmore consideration.” See
Robert A. Anthony, Which Agency Interpretations Should Bind Citizens and the Courts?, 7
YALE J. ON REG . 1, 3 & 13 (1990) [hereinafter Anthony, Which Interpretations]
(contrasting the Chevron and Skidmore standards); see also Robert A. Anthony, Which
Agency Interpretations Should Get Judicial Deference?—A Preliminary Inquiry, 40 ADMIN. L.
REV. 121, 122 (1988) (explaining that “Chevron requires outright acceptance of the
agency’s interpretation,” provided it is reasonable and not against statutory intent).
Chevron analysis should not, however, be misunderstood to be a one-step method in
which the court must accept the agency’s interpretation as controlling—rather than
treating it as persuasive, as in Skidmore—if the court finds that agency’s interpretation
is sufficiently reasonable. Cf. supra note 2 (explaining why the term “Chevron
analysis” is preferable to “Chevron deference”).
21. See 1 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 2, at 110 (“Chevron is one of the most
important decisions in the history of administrative law. It has been cited and
applied in over 1,000 cases in the last decade.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Law and
Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2075 (1990) (commenting that
Chevron “has become a kind of Marbury, or counter-Marbury, for the administrative
state”); see also Sanford N. Greenberg, Who Says It’s a Crime: Chevron Deference to
Agency Interpretations of Regulatory Statutes that Create Criminal Liability, 58 U. PITT. L.
REV. 1, 69 (1996) (“Chevron and other well-established administrative law
doctrines . . . .”); Keith Werhan, The Neo-Classical Revival in Administrative Law, 44
ADMIN. L. REV. 567, 591 (1992) (“Chevron fits a pattern of decisions that is sufficiently
established to suggest the emergence of a new paradigm of administrative law.”).
22. The Supreme Court had previously applied Chevron analysis to a customs
regulation in K-Mart v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 282, 294 (1986) (finding a Customs
Service regulation governing the importation of “grey-market goods” valid in part
and invalid in part under Chevron analysis). Haggar, however, was distinguishable
because the statutory interpretation involved tariff classification and because the
litigation originated in the CIT, which exercised de novo review, rather than in a
district court as in K-Mart.
23. See 28 U.S.C. § 1340 (1994) (providing that jurisdiction of district courts
under federal statutes providing for revenue from imports or tonnage is limited to
matters not within the jurisdiction of the CIT); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1355 (1994)
(providing that jurisdiction of district courts under federal fines, penalties, and
forfeitures is limited to matters not within the jurisdiction of the CIT).
24. See 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (1994) (providing that CIT has exclusive jurisdiction
to review the denial of a protest by the Customs Service under section 515 of the
Tariff Act, 19 U.S.C. § 1515).
25. See id.; 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (1994) (providing that the CAFC has exclusive
jurisdiction of appeals from final decisions of the CIT).
26. See 28 U.S.C. § 2640(a)(1) (1994) (providing de novo review of the denial of a
protest by the Customs Service).
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the powers of a federal district court.27 In view of the CIT’s history
and its unusual power of de novo judicial review of Customs Service
decisions, it was not self-evident that customs law incorporates the
principle inherent in Chevron analysis that a court must, in specified
circumstances, accept the agency’s interpretation of a statute.28
Because the Customs Service’s interpretation in Haggar was
embodied in a legislative regulation,29 the Supreme Court’s decision
may well have been predictable even from existing customs
jurisprudence.30 But the presence of a legislative regulation also
means that the impact of Haggar on de novo judicial review in other
legal contexts remains unclear.31 In addition to promulgating
27. See infra note 217 and accompanying text (discussing the CIT’s status as
successor to an administrative tribunal within the Department of the Treasury that
continues to possess the same powers and duties as that tribunal, plus the same
powers as district courts).
28. Prior to Haggar, the issues of Chevron analysis and deference to Customs
Service interpretations in customs litigation had been debated extensively for several
years, particularly at the Judicial Conferences of the CIT. See Proceedings of the Tenth
Judicial Conference of the United States Court of International Trade, 185 F.R.D. 395, 422-36
(Apr. 17, 1997) (discussing the standard for judicial review in customs cases);
Proceedings of the Ninth Judicial Conference of the United States Court of International Trade,
161 F.R.D. 547, 633-46 (Nov. 16, 1994) (discussing recent development in customs
law); Michelle F. Forte, Are Valuation Cases Really Reviewed De Novo?, 25 L. & POL.
INT’ L BUS. 25 (1993) (Eighth USCIT Judicial Conference); Carla Garcia-Benitez, The
“Deference to the Agency” Doctrine: To What Extent Should it Apply to the Customs Service’s
Interpretation of a Tariff Term in Classification Cases?, 20 BROOK. J. INT’ L L. 577 (1995)
(Ninth USCIT Judicial Conference); Joseph S. Kaplan, De Novo Proceedings in the
United States Court of International Trade—Are the Issues of Statutory Construction Beyond
The Expertise of the Court? (Apr. 17, 1997) (Tenth USCIT Judicial Conference);
Michael P. Maxwell, Judicial Deference to U.S. Customs Service Determinations (Nov. 18,
1988) (Fifth USCIT Judicial Conference); Michael P. Maxwell, Standard of Review of
Customs Cases before the United States Court of International Trade (Apr. 17, 1997) (Tenth
USCIT Judicial Conference); John P. Simpson, The Standard of Review in Customs
Litigation (Apr. 17, 1997) (Tenth USCIT Judicial Conference) (copies of all sources
in this note on file with the American University Law Review).
29. The Administrative Procedure Act defines “regulation” or “rule” as “an
agency statement of general or particular applicability and future effect designed to
implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy . . . .” Administrative Procedure Act,
5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1994). Regulations or rules are typically divided into legislative or
substantive rules, procedural rules, and interpretive rules. See BERNARD SCHWARTZ,
ADMINISTRATIVE L AW 180 (3d ed. 1991) (noting the three main types of agency rules).
A legislative rule is one that “affect[s] individual rights and obligations.” Chrysler
Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 302 (1979) (quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 232
(1974)). “[A] legislative rule has the same binding effect as a statute.” 1 DAVIS &
PIERCE, supra note 2, at 233.
30. See United States v. Haggar Apparel Co., 526 U.S. 380, 393 (1999) (citing
PATRICK C. REED , THE ROLE OF FEDERAL C OURTS IN U.S. CUSTOMS & INTERNATIONAL
TRADE LAW 289 (1997), for the proposition that “[c]onsistent with the Chevron
methodology, and as has long been the rule in customs cases, customs regulations
are sustained if they represent reasonable interpretations of the statute”).
31. See Mead Corp. v. United States, 185 F.3d 1304, 1306-07 (Fed. Cir. 1999), cert.
granted, 120 S. Ct. 2193 (2000) (discussing whether Haggar applies to a Customs
Service ruling letter on tariff classification); Baxter Healthcare Corp. v. United States,
182 F.3d 1333, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (stating that where no regulation applies,
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legislative regulations, the Customs Service interprets statutes by
making informal adjudications32 in several different procedural
settings33 and by issuing interpretive rules or guidelines.34 In fact, the
vast majority of statutory interpretations by the Customs Service are
embodied in some format other than regulations.35 Haggar does not
expressly determine whether Chevron analysis is required for these
other interpretive formats. Furthermore, the Customs Service
interprets a variety of statutes serving several different purposes, and
these statutes include tariff nomenclature provisions governed by a
set of interpretive rules that are unique in American law.36 Haggar
does not determine whether Chevron analysis extends with equal force
“[o]ur analysis . . . only requires a determination of the proper meaning and scope
of the relevant provisions and a determination of the ultimate classification”);
Avenues in Leather, Inc. v. United States, 178 F.3d 1241, 1244 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
(stating that Haggar “may . . . raise questions regarding the proper standard of
review” where no regulation applies, but “leav[ing] the standard of review question
for another day”); see also Bruce G. Forrest, Post-Haggar Issues: Pressing Deference
Questions for the New Millennium 6-7 (Dec. 7, 1999) (Eleventh USCIT Judicial
Conference) (arguing that “as the legal basis for refusing to accord the agency
customary, Chevron deference was unanimously held to be incorrect, the Federal
Circuit [subsequently] . . . erred in its reversion to . . . [its] pre-Haggar position for all
cases not involving agency interpretations embodied in Customs Service
regulations”).
32. “Adjudication” is statutorily defined as “agency process for the formulation
of” any “final disposition . . . [by] an agency in a matter other than rule making . . . .”
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551(6) & (7) (1994). “Informal
adjudication” refers to adjudication that is not conducted in a trial-type, on-therecord proceeding governed by the Administrative Procedure Act, id. § 554, or a
substantially equivalent trial-type hearing. See generally STRAUSS, supra note 5, at 142
(“[I]nformal adjudications constitute the great bulk of government actions meeting
the statutory definition of ‘adjudication,’ perhaps as much as 95% of those actions.”).
33. See infra Part V (discussing situations in which the Customs Service makes
interpretations in non-regulation formats).
34. In contrast to a legislative rule that sets out binding law, see supra note 29
(discussing the types of administrative rules and regulations), “[a]n interpretive rule
is an expression by the agency of its own construction of a statute or rule” that
“serve[s] an advisory function . . . [by] express[ing] an agency’s intended course of
action or its view of the meaning of a statute or regulation . . . [or by] advis[ing] the
public of the agency’s construction of the law it administers.” SCHWARTZ, supra note
29, at 181 (footnotes omitted).
35. See Mead Corp., 185 F.3d at 1307 (“The Customs Service generally does not
use regulations as the format for issuing its interpretations of the Tariff Act. In fact,
the regulations . . . at issue in Haggar form one of the very few areas where such
interpretative regulations have been issued under the Tariff Act.”).
36. See Stone & Downer Co. v. United States, 12 Ct. Cust. 62, 70, T.D. 40019
(1923). The case notes that:
Tariff laws, while subject to the same rules of construction and legal
principles for the most part as other legislative acts, yet have during a
century and a half of application acquired certain characteristics not found
in other legislation, and certain definite principles of law have been laid
down by the courts in construing tariff laws which of necessity do not apply
to other kinds of legislation.
Id. See also infra notes 265-71 and accompanying text (outlining the method of
interpretation in classification cases).
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to all customs statutes. Fundamentally, although it holds that being
bound by customs regulations does not impair the CIT’s authority to
conduct de novo review,37 Haggar does not explain comprehensively
what issues the CIT is required to decide independently under de
novo review. If the CIT is required to accept agency interpretations of
the customs statutes, why Congress created a specialized, expert court
with power to conduct de novo review is unclear. Could an agency
interpretation pre-empt the CIT’s de novo application of the law to a
particular set of facts? In short, given the nature, history, and the
roles of the Customs Service and the CIT, as well as the statutes they
interpret, Haggar can only be a starting point for understanding the
application of Chevron analysis in de novo judicial review under the
customs laws. Equally important, the narrowness of the Supreme
Court’s holding means that Haggar offers only limited guidance on
these issues.
The future impact of Haggar also has significant implications for
understanding the application of Chevron in other areas of
administrative law. In particular, the Supreme Court’s 1996 decision
in Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A.38 refers to a “presumption”
underlying Chevron analysis that Congress intended ambiguities in
agency-administered statutes to be resolved by the agency rather than
the courts.39 This Article proposes that this presumption underlying
Chevron analysis is rebuttable where the justifications for the
presumption are not present.40 In the customs context, the history,
expertise, and powers of the CIT, including its power of de novo
review, lead to the conclusion that the presumption should be
rebutted in customs law in a number of situations.
Part I of this Article analyzes the Haggar litigation and outlines,
first, the reasons for the lower courts’ conclusion that Chevron analysis
did not apply to Customs Service classification interpretations and,
second, the reasons for the Supreme Court’s contrary decision that
Chevron analysis is required for review of a customs classification
regulation.41 Part I concludes with an examination of what questions
remain open after Haggar: Given the CIT’s history and powers,
37. See United States v. Haggar Apparel Co., 526 U.S. 380, 394 (1999).
38. 517 U.S. 735 (1996).
39. See id. at 740-41 (stating that Congress is presumed to desire agencies to
possess whatever degree of discretion the ambiguity allows); see also infra notes 148-77
and accompanying text (discussing the origin and rationale of the “presumption”
underlying Chevron analysis).
40. See infra notes 154-68 and accompanying text (discussing the “agency
expertise justification,” “policy making justification,” and “reasoned decision
making” or “format justification”).
41. See infra notes 68-125 and accompanying text.
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should Chevron analysis apply to interpretations not embodied in
regulations, and should it apply to all subject matters within customs
law?42
Parts II through V amplify the discussion of how and to what extent
the CIT should apply Chevron analysis in customs litigation in light of
Haggar. Part II reviews the general principles underlying Chevron
analysis.43 This discussion begins from the accepted understanding
that Chevron created a presumption that Congress delegated
legislative authority to the agency.44 The idea that this delegation
should be presumed is, in turn, justified by three generalizations:
(1) that the agency, rather than the reviewing court, is an expert on
the statute in issue; (2) that resolving an ambiguity in a statute
involves a policy judgment, which is more appropriately made by the
agency than by a court; and (3) that the agency is authorized to make
interpretations in a reasoned decision-making format (such as a
legislative regulation).45 Part II then, however, sets out this Article’s
suggestion that the presumption of delegation underlying Chevron is
rebuttable where the underlying justifications are not present.46
Therefore, to determine the applicability of Chevron in customs
litigation, the reviewing court needs to assess the institutional
structure for administering and enforcing the customs statutes, the
purpose of the particular customs statute in issue, and the format in
which the agency expresses its interpretation.
Part III examines the delegation of norm-making authority under
the customs statutes by examining the institutional structure for
customs litigation.47 This structure is not the more common model of
an administrative agency whose decisions are subject to review by a
court of general jurisdiction. A court of general jurisdiction does not
possess expertise in a particular area and does not conduct de novo
review.48 This Article argues that the institutional structure for
42. See infra notes 126-41 and accompanying text.
43. See infra Part II (examining the justifications and legitimacy of Chevron
analysis).
44. See infra notes 142-56 and accompanying text (explaining the presumption of
delegation).
45. See infra notes 157-68 and accompanying text (elaborating the three
justifications underlying the presumption of delegation to agencies); see also Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-45 (1984)
(articulating the principles governing the delegation of legislative authority to an
agency).
46. See infra notes 170-82 and accompanying text.
47. See infra notes 185-237 and accompanying text (examining the justification
supporting the Chevron/Smiley presumption of delegation that the agency, not the
court, is an expert in the regulatory regime).
48. See infra notes 147-53 (discussing how the structure in customs law has
resulted in an adjudicatory body with significant expertise).
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customs litigation is, or at least has evolved from, a “splitenforcement” regime.49 In this regime, administration of the law in
the first instance is assigned to the agency, but the CIT shares
authority because it possesses specialized expertise in customs law
and is granted broad adjudicatory powers.50 Therefore, the splitenforcement nature of customs litigation rebuts the justification
underlying Chevron analysis that the agency, and not the court,
possesses expertise on the ambiguous statute.
Part IV argues that the purposes of the substantive customs statutes
affect the extent to which courts should utilize Chevron analysis.51
Customs statutes relating to the assessment of customs duties are
taxation or revenue statutes rather than remedial or public-policy
statutes. A general principle of statutory interpretation posits that
courts should strictly construe revenue statutes against the
government.52 This Article asserts that customs taxation cases, which
account for the vast majority of customs litigation, are a category in
which Chevron analysis has the least potential applicability.53 Customs
cases that do not involve revenue issues are less common, and
although Chevron analysis seems more appropriate under such
statutes, its applicability remains an open question.54
Part V argues that the format of the Customs Service’s statutory
interpretation also affects the extent to which courts should apply
Chevron analysis.55 Part V reviews the alternative procedural formats
for informal adjudications by the Customs Service, including the
extent to which informal adjudications serve as interpretive
guidelines in the form of administrative precedents.56 It also
considers Customs Service interpretive rules and guidelines.57 Part V
49. See infra notes 216-17 and accompanying text (discussing the evolution of the
“split-enforcement” structure in customs law).
50. See infra note 192 and accompanying text (explaining the split enforcement
model in which Congress assigns enforcement and adjudicatory functions to separate
agencies).
51. See infra notes 239-325 and accompanying text (discussing and examining the
interpretive principles as applies to customs statutes).
52. See infra notes 244-48 and accompanying text (describing the general rule of
strict construction of revenue statutes).
53. See infra notes 244-54 and accompanying text (noting that, in general, statutes
imposing tax obligations for raising revenue are strictly interpreted against the
government).
54. See infra notes 260-75 and accompanying text (considering classification cases
and the complex interpretive norms used in these cases).
55. See infra notes 326-406 and accompanying text (discussing the various formats
in which the Customs Service can issue its interpretations).
56. See infra notes 327-44 and accompanying text (considering the interpretive
format of the Customs Service’s decisions).
57. See infra notes 349-53 and accompanying text (outlining four primary formats
used by the Customs Service in issuing “rulings”).
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then discusses the first generation progeny of Haggar––Mead Corp. v.
United States58––in which the CAFC ruled that a Customs Service
ruling letter was not covered by Haggar, and was not entitled to
Chevron deference.59 The Supreme Court has now granted certiorari
in Mead, tacitly acknowledging both the narrowness of Haggar and
the importance of answering the questions Haggar did not resolve.
Ultimately, this Article concludes that the applicability of Chevron
analysis to customs litigation is limited.60 In assessing whether to
apply Chevron analysis, based on an implied delegation of legislative
authority to the Customs Service, the CIT and CAFC should consider
Congress’ decision to create an expert court with power to conduct de
novo review, the purpose of the substantive statute at issue, and the
interpretive format used by the agency. Substantive customs statutes
that implicate a revenue function generally do not support an
implied delegation to the agency to make binding interpretations in
any format other than a regulation.61 In contrast, customs statutes
involving non-revenue policies (such as protective regimes for
import-sensitive industries, consumer protection, or foreign policy)
may support an implied delegation of authority to the agency to
make binding interpretations in additional formats besides
regulations.62
Even where the substance supports an implied
delegation, the interpretation must be set out in a decision-making
format supported by sufficient reasoning and based on notice-andcomment or adversarial participation and must represent an agencywide interpretation.63 As will be developed more fully below, the
authors believe that the existence of the CIT and its power of de novo
review, together with the purpose of the underlying statute in issue
and the format of the interpretation in Mead, all militate against
Chevron analysis. Based on these considerations, we believe that the
Supreme Court should affirm the CAFC’s decision in Mead.
I.

THE HAGGAR DECISION

The importance and novelty of Haggar stem from whether Chevron
58. 185 F.3d 1304 (Fed. Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 2193 (2000).
59. See id. at 1307 (comparing customs regulations with customs rulings).
60. See infra notes 407-09 and accompanying text (arguing that the case law is
uncertain and currently awaiting further review by the Supreme Court).
61. See infra notes 276-310 (analyzing customs cases that implicate a revenue
function).
62. See infra notes 311-25 and accompanying text (analyzing Chevron
methodology in non-revenue cases such as international trade and foreign policy).
63. See infra notes 379-406 and accompanying text (examining whether the
interpretive format reveals that the agency considered the issue in a detailed and
reasoned manner before making its interpretation).
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analysis is applicable in de novo customs litigation in the CIT. To
introduce this issue, it is instructive to review the decisions by the CIT
and CAFC in Haggar in light of the CIT’s history and the statutes
governing the CIT’s powers.64 As discussed in Section A below, the
lower courts concluded that those statutes preclude Chevron analysis
in customs classification cases.65 The courts’ reasons for this
conclusion provide the foundation for Section B below, which
explains the Supreme Court’s contrary interpretation of how the
CIT’s powers are to be reconciled with the modern administrative law
phenomenon of Chevron analysis.66 Section C below then examines
the difficult questions that remain unresolved by the Haggar
decision.67
A. The History of the CIT and the Lower Court Decisions in Haggar
The CIT has the same powers and occupies the same level in the
federal judicial hierarchy as a district court, but operates under
distinctive institutional statutes.68 It is the latest in a series of
specialized tribunals for customs litigation.69 The first such tribunal
was the Board of General Appraisers, an administrative tribunal in
the Department of the Treasury created in 1890 to adjudicate issues
of valuation, classification, and applicable rates of duty under the
customs and tariff laws.70 In 1926, the Board was renamed the United
States Customs Court, while retaining the same jurisdiction, powers,
and duties.71 In 1956, Congress declared that the Customs Court was
a court established under Article III of the Constitution.72 These
historical developments culminated in the enactment of the Customs

64. See infra notes 68-79 and accompanying text (discussing the CIT’s history and
institutional statutes in relation to Chevron analysis).
65. See infra notes 80-101 and accompanying text (reviewing the lower court’s
reasons for rejecting Chevron analysis).
66. See infra notes 102-25 and accompanying text (considering the Supreme
Court’s review and reversal of the lower court’s decision).
67. See infra notes 126-41 and accompanying text (evaluating possible alternative
interpretations of the Supreme Court’s decision in Haggar).
68. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 251-257, 1581-1585, 2631-2646 (1994) (setting out
organization, jurisdiction, and procedures of the CIT).
69. See generally REED , supra note 30, chs. 2-6 (discussing the historical evolution
of the institutions of judicial review in customs and international trade law).
70. See Act of June 10, 1890, ch. 407, § 12, 26 Stat. 131, 136 (creating Board of
General Appraisers).
71. See Act of May 28, 1926, ch. 411, 44 Stat. 669, 669 (“[T]he Board of General
Appraisers shall hereafter be known as the United States Customs Court . . . . The
jurisdiction, powers, and duties of said board . . . shall remain the same as by existing
law provided.”).
72. See Act of July 14, 1956, ch. 589, 70 Stat. 532 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 251(a)
(1994)) (amending the organic statute of the Customs Court).
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Courts Act of 1980,73 in which the Customs Court was renamed the
Court of International Trade and was given increased jurisdiction
and powers, including the same powers as a federal district court.74 In
short, the CIT is simultaneously a federal court and the direct
successor to an administrative tribunal.
Three statutory provisions governing the CIT’s functions and
procedures potentially affect the use of Chevron analysis in customs
litigation. First, in cases reviewing the Customs Service’s denial of a
protest by an importer against Customs Service action, the CIT
“make[s] its determinations upon the basis of the record made
before the court.”75 This section “provides for trial de novo in the
Court of International Trade . . .”76 and “restate[d] existing law”77 as
of the enactment of the Customs Courts Act of 1980. Second, among
its remedial powers, the CIT may order further proceedings “to
enable it to reach the correct decision.”78 A third provision of the
CIT’s governing statutes provides that the protested decision of the
Customs Service “is presumed to be correct” and “the burden of
proving otherwise shall rest upon the party challenging such
decision.”79
The specific issue in Haggar was whether the CIT should
independently interpret a statutory provision governing the tariff
classification of imported merchandise or, instead, should apply the
legal standard set out in a customs regulation.80 The regulation had
been issued by the Customs Service to interpret and implement the
tariff provision claimed by the importer.81 Both the CIT and the
73. Pub. L. No. 96-417, 94 Stat. 1727.
74. See 28 U.S.C. § 1585 (1994) (“The Court of International Trade shall possess
all the powers in law and equity of, or as conferred by statute upon, a district court of
the United States.”).
75. 28 U.S.C. § 2640(a) (1994).
76. H.R. REP. NO. 96-1235, at 59 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3729,
3770-71.
77. Id.
78. 28 U.S.C. § 2643(b) (1994).
79. 28 U.S.C. § 2639(a)(1) (1994).
80. See United States v. Haggar Apparel Co., 526 U.S. 380, 384 (1999)
(considering whether imported trousers were eligible for a partial duty exemption
under a tariff provision for “[a]rticles . . . assembled abroad . . . of fabricated
components, the product of the United States, which . . . (c) have not been advanced
in value or improved in condition abroad except by being assembled and except by
operations incidental to the assembly process such as cleaning, lubricating and
painting”) (citing subheading 9802.00.80, Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United
States, 19 U.S.C. § 1202 (1994)). At issue in Haggar was whether a permapressing
operation performed on the trousers was “incidental to the assembly process” within
the meaning of this statute. Id.
81. See 19 C.F.R. § 10.16(c) (1999) (providing in part that “[a]ny significant
process, operation, or treatment other than assembly whose primary purpose is
the . . . physical or chemical improvement of a component . . . shall not be regarded
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CAFC declined to apply the legal standard in the regulation.82 The
CAFC stated that the CIT “properly rejected the United States’
argument that Customs’ regulations interpreting and applying this
statute are entitled to deference under [Chevron].”83 Rather than
engaging in an in-depth analysis of Chevron, the CAFC simply relied
on its own recent precedents,84 principally Universal Electronics v.
United States85 and Rollerblade v. United States,86 together with other case
law cited in those two opinions. In these cases preceding Haggar, the
CAFC and CIT had advanced four reasons against deferring to
Customs Service interpretations in classification cases under Chevron.
First, the CAFC ruled that the statutory presumption of correctness
attaching to the Customs Service’s decision did not provide a basis for
deference to a statutory interpretation by the Customs Service.87 The
CAFC explained that the presumption of correctness applies to the
factual components and not the legal components of the decision.88
Questions of law are “within the domain of the courts . . . [and] the
importer has no duty to produce evidence as to what the law means
because evidence is irrelevant to that legal inquiry.”89 Furthermore,
said the court, “the presumption of correctness, being a procedural
device allocating the roles between the two litigating parties, is
as incidental to the assembly and shall preclude the application of the exemption to
such article . . .” and that “[c]hemical treatment of components or assembled articles
to impart new characteristics, such as . . . permapressing” represented an example of
an operation not considered incidental to assembly).
82. See Haggar Apparel Co. v. United States, 938 F. Supp. 868, 874-75 (Ct. Int’l
Trade 1996), aff’d, 127 F.3d 1460 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
83. Haggar, 127 F.3d at 1462. Prior to reaching the issue of Chevron deference,
however, the CAFC ruled that the CIT “looked to the express language of the statute
and correctly concluded that the statute does not prohibit advancement in value
where the operation in question is incidental to the assembly process.” Id.; see also
Haggar, 938 F. Supp. at 874 (“[The regulation] conflicts with the plain language of
[the statute].”).
84. See Haggar, 127 F.3d at 1462 (citing Universal Elecs., Inc. v. United States, 112
F.3d 488, 491-93 (Fed. Cir. 1997), and Rollerblade, Inc. v. United States, 112 F.3d
481, 483 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). In relying on Rollerblade and Universal Electronics, the
CAFC apparently did not consider that these decisions might be distinguishable from
Haggar since they did not involve the applicability of a customs regulation.
85. 112 F.3d 488 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
86. 112 F.3d 481 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
87. See id. at 483-84 (deciding that no deference attaches to Customs’
classification where there are no disputed issues of material fact); Universal Elecs., 112
F.3d at 491-93 (same).
88. See Universal Elecs., 112 F.3d at 492 (ruling that “[t]he presumption of
correctness is a procedural device that” requires the importer, as plaintiff, to
“produce evidence . . . that demonstrates by a preponderance . . . that Customs’
classification decision is incorrect”).
89. Id. (italics in original). Accord Rollerblade, 112 F.3d at 484 (“[T]he statutory
presumption of correctness under § 2639 is irrelevant where there is no factual
dispute between the parties.”) (citing Goodman Mfg. v. United States, 69 F.3d 505,
508 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).
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analytically distinct from the deference afforded to a Customs’
decision, which is instead governed by standards of review.”90 The
argument that the presumption of correctness should be applied “as
a means of affording deference to Customs’ interpretation of the law”
erroneously “commingl[ed] . . . two notions that are designed to
serve separate functions.”91
Second, the CAFC and CIT ruled that the notion of deference was
inconsistent with the CIT’s statutory requirement that it “reach the
correct decision.”92 In fact, according to the CAFC, the CIT’s
requirement to “reach the correct decision” provides a statutory
mandate to “decide independently the meaning of a classification
term.”93 The CIT agreed that “the Court’s responsibility to exercise
its own judgment as to what is the proper classification of the
merchandise under review” was “implicit” in reaching the correct
result.94 And because Chevron analysis could lead the reviewing court
to sustain a reasonable interpretation, the court deemed this
outcome “logically incompatible” with the CIT’s congressional charge
“to reject any interpretation, however reasonable, that . . . [it]
determines is incorrect.”95
Third, the CAFC and CIT ruled that the CIT “does not defer to
Customs’ decisions because it has been tasked by Congress to
conduct a de novo review, and to determine the correct classification
based on the record made before it.”96 The CAFC’s opinions do not
elaborate on the concept of de novo review, and apparently treat this
rationale against deference as largely a corollary of reaching the
correct result.97
Fourth, the CAFC and CIT relied on the long history of customs
law and the role of customs tribunals in interpreting the law. The
90. Universal Elecs., 112 F.3d at 493.
91. Id. at 492.
92. Rollerblade, 112 F.3d at 484.
93. Id.
94. Semperit Indus. Prods., Inc. v. United States, 855 F. Supp. 1292, 1299-1300
(Ct. Int’l Trade 1994) (cited with approval in Rollerblade, 112 F.3d at 484) (reiterating
the CAFC’s position that no Chevron deference is owed to classification decisions by
Customs).
95. Semperit, 855 F. Supp. at 1300 (cited with approval in Rollerblade, 112 F.3d at
484) (emphasis added). In Rollerblade, the CAFC relied on the duty to reach the
correct result as an additional reason for its rejection of deference based on the
presumption of correctness. 112 F.3d at 484. According to the Court, the CIT would
be “shirk[ing] its responsibility of deciding what a classification term means by
simply saying the challenger failed to persuade the court that its interpretation is
more ‘correct’ than that of Customs.” Id.
96. Universal Elecs., 112 F.3d at 493.
97. See id. (concluding without significant discussion that deference is
inappropriate because of CIT’s statutory mandate to perform de novo review).
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CAFC cited with approval the CIT’s decision in Anval Nyby Powder AB
v. United States,98 in which the CIT stated that “the court’s
longstanding practice of interpreting the tariff schedules” and “the
sheer weight of past practice and precedent in customs litigation
spanning over a century” provided an additional ground supporting
its decision to make independent statutory interpretations in
classification cases.99 The historical practice to which the CIT
referred was that the “meaning of a . . . term used in a tariff act [was]
a question of law to be decided by the court . . . ,”100 and “[t]he
customs courts used a Skidmore-type approach [to assess any pertinent
interpretation by the Customs Service] in which the agency’s
interpretation was considered persuasive to the extent that it
appeared to merit it.”101
B. The Supreme Court Decision in Haggar
The Supreme Court read the CAFC’s reasoning in Haggar as
finding the Chevron two-step analysis inapplicable to judicial review of
customs regulations in classification cases.102 The Court held that the
98. 927 F. Supp. 463, 468-69 (1996) (cited with approval in Universal Elecs., 112
F.3d at 493 n.5, for explanation of the rationale based on reaching the correct
result).
99. Id. The CIT suggested that independent judicial interpretation resulted
from this historical practice, plus the combined operation of the three statutory
provisions on the presumption of correctness regarding factual issues, trial de novo,
and reaching the correct result. See id.
100. American Express Co. v. United States, 39 C.C.P.A. 8, 10 (1951); accord
United States v. National Carloading Corp., 48 C.C.P.A. 70, 71 (1961) (“The
common meaning of the word [in the tariff provision] is a matter of law to be
determined by the court.”).
101. REED , supra note 30, at 284 (discussing questions of law in customs cases prior
to Chevron). See, e.g., Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co. v. United States, 480 F.2d 1352,
1361 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (stating that “[l]ong-established administrative practice may
bear on the construction of the tariff laws,” but it is “comparable to other extrinsic
aids to ascertaining legislative intent which come into play when the construction of
a statutory provision is in doubt”); Washington Handle Co. v. United States, 34
C.C.P.A. 80, 85 (1946) (“Administrative practice without subsequent legislation,
although a matter of consideration for the courts in close cases, is seldom a
controlling consideration.”).
102. See United States v. Haggar Apparel Co., 526 U.S. 380, 385 (1999) (“[T]he
[CAFC] declined to analyze the regulation under Chevron . . . .”). Despite the
Supreme Court’s conclusion, it seems arguable that the CIT’s and CAFC’s reasoning
was consistent with the Chevron two-step analysis. The CIT ruled that the regulation
conflicted with the plain language of the statute. See Haggar Apparel Co. v. United
States, 938 F. Supp. 868, 874 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1996) (reasoning that the customs
regulation, 19 C.F.R. § 10.16 (1988), conflicted with the plain language of the statute
because the statute does not prohibit the processing of an item in a manner that
imparts new characteristics as long as it was incidental to the item’s assembly). The
CAFC affirmed that the CIT interpreted the language properly. See Haggar Apparel
Co. v. United States, 127 F.3d 1460, 1461 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (explaining that the CIT
correctly interpreted the statute because it “does not prohibit advancement in value
where the operation in question is incidental to the assembly process”). The
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CAFC’s failure to evaluate the regulation in accordance with Chevron
analysis constituted reversible error.103
The Supreme Court began by determining that Congress had
delegated to the Customs Service the authority to issue regulations
governing the classification of imported merchandise that would
bind importers.104 The Court noted that:
The Customs Service (which is within the Treasury Department) is
charged with the classification of imported goods under the proper
provision of the tariff schedules in the first instance . . . . [T]he
Secretary [of the Treasury] is directed by statute to “establish and
promulgate such rules and regulations not inconsistent with the
law . . . as may be necessary to secure a just, impartial and uniform
appraisement [valuation] of imported merchandise and the
classification and assessment of duty thereon at the various ports of
105
entry.”

The Court concluded that the customs regulations at issue were
binding on importers because they “help define the legal relations
between the Government and regulated entities” and Congress
authorized the regulation “in part to clarify the rights and obligations
of importers.”106
The Supreme Court then turned to Haggar’s contention that the
CIT’s reviewing authority in classification cases––the powers to
conduct de novo review and reach the “correct result”––precluded
Chevron analysis.107 The Court rejected, first, the argument that de
novo review meant that the CIT “owes no deference to the regulation
under Chevron principles.”108 According to the Court, the conclusion
barring Chevron analysis did not follow from the premise of de novo
review.109 “Valid regulations,” said the Court, “establish legal norms,”
and “[c]ourts can give them proper effect even while applying the law
opinions can arguably be read as rejections of the government’s argument that the
regulation was entitled to deference under Chevron, as opposed to an argument that
the regulation was subject to Chevron analysis. If the courts had simply stated that
deference is unwarranted where the agency’s interpretation conflicts with the
language of the statute, it is difficult to imagine that the Supreme Court would have
granted certiorari.
103. See Haggar, 526 U.S. at 394.
104. See id. at 387 (discussing the statute authorizing the issuance of customs
regulations).
105. Id. (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1502(a) (1994)).
106. Id. at 388. Focusing on the language of the specific regulation at issue, the
Court also ruled that “nothing in the regulation itself persuades us that the agency
intended the regulation to have some lesser force and effect [than usual notice-andcomment legislative regulations].” Id. at 390.
107. See id.
108. Id. at 391.
109. See id.

KELLYJCI.DOC

1184

6/19/2001 10:48 AM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:1167

to new-found facts, just as any court conducting a trial in the first
instance must conform its rulings to controlling statutes, rules, and
judicial precedents.”110 Furthermore, the Court opined:
De novo proceedings presume a foundation of law. The question
here is whether the regulations are part of that controlling law.
Deference can be given to the regulations without impairing the
authority of the court to make factual determinations, and apply
111
those determinations to the law, de novo.

For similar reasons, the Court rejected the argument that the CIT’s
duty to reach the correct result was logically inconsistent with
deference to the regulations.112 The regulations enabled a consistent
and proper interpretation of the statute.113
Thus, according
deference to those regulations was not inconsistent with the court’s
mandate to reach the correct result.114
The Supreme Court was also unpersuaded by the argument that
“Chevron deference is inconsistent with the historical practice in
customs cases,” finding that the historical practice “is not so uniform
and clear as to convince us that judicial deference would thwart
congressional intent.”115 The Court noted an 1809 decision, United
States v. Vowell,116 in which Chief Justice Marshall stated that “[i]f the
question had been doubtful, the court would have respected the
uniform construction which it understood has been given by the
treasury department of the United States upon similar questions.”117
The Court also referred to a treatise on customs litigation which
indicated that the standard of review of customs regulations had long
been consistent with Chevron analysis.118 And it cited its decision in
Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States,119 a case in which the Court deferred
to the Treasury Department’s reasonable interpretation of the
countervailing duty statute, notwithstanding the trial court’s authority
to conduct de novo review.120
For these reasons, the Supreme Court held that the CIT is
required, as are other courts, to give regulations Chevron deference in
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. See id. at 391-92 (noting that the CAFC has consistently held that the CIT’s
charge to “reach the correct decision” is inconsistent with granting agency
deference).
113. See id.
114. See id. at 392.
115. Id. at 393.
116. 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 368 (1809).
117. Id. at 372 (quoting Chief Justice Marshall).
118. Haggar, 526 U.S. at 393 (quoting REED , supra note 30, at 289).
119. 437 U.S. 443 (1978).
120. See Haggar, 526 U.S. at 393 (citing Zenith).
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appropriate circumstances.121 The Court added that “[t]he expertise
of the Court of International Trade . . . guides it in making complex
determinations in a specialized area of law; it is well positioned to
evaluate customs regulations and their operation in light of the
statutory mandate to determine whether the preconditions for
Chevron deference are present.”122
Turning to the specific statute and customs regulation at issue in
Haggar, the Court determined that under the first step of the Chevron
analysis the statute was ambiguous because Congress did not have a
specific intention on the question in issue.123 Under the second step
of the Chevron methodology, the Court found that the various
arguments raised difficult questions that would be best addressed by
the lower courts.124 Accordingly, the Court remanded the case to the
CAFC to determine under step two of Chevron analysis whether the
regulations are reasonable.125
C. The Open Questions After Haggar
The Supreme Court approached Haggar from the premise that
Chevron analysis is the “usual rule” and the “customary framework” in
judicial review of agency regulations.126 Based on this premise, the
Court considered whether there was any reason why review of the
challenged regulation should not be governed by Chevron analysis.
The Court found that three of the CAFC’s four bases for declining to
121. Id. at 394.
122. Id. The Court compared the CIT to the Tax Court and noted that the Tax
Court is required to use Chevron analysis in reviewing tax regulations. See id.
123. See id. at 393. The Court noted:
The statute . . . gives direction not only by stating a general principle (to
grant the partial exemption where only assembly and incidental operations
were abroad) but also by determining some specifics of the policy (finding
that painting, for example, is incidental to assembly). For purposes of the
Chevron analysis, the statute is ambiguous . . . in that the agency must use its
discretion to determine how best to implement the policy in those cases not
covered by the statute’s specific terms.
Id.
124. See id. at 395 (instructing the lower courts to address on remand whether
permapressing is a process covered by the statute or the regulations).
125. See id. (indicating that either the CAFC or the CIT could decide the second
Chevron step on remand). A companion case, Levi Strauss & Co. v. United States, 156
F.3d 1345, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (ruling that legal precedent rejects any deference to
Customs’ interpretations of tariff classifications), vacated by United States v. Levi
Strauss & Co., 527 U.S. 1001 (1999), was considered with Haggar on a parallel basis.
On remand, the CAFC sustained the regulation under step two of Chevron. See
Haggar, No. 97-1002, 2000 WL 1035747 (Fed. Cir. July 27, 2000); Levi Strauss, No. 971536, 2000 WL 1035749 (Fed. Cir. July 27, 2000).
126. See Haggar, 526 U.S. at 389-90 (referring to “the usual rule of Chevron
deference”; “the usual rule that regulations of an administering agency warrant
deference”; “this customary framework”).
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defer to agency interpretations––the CIT’s authority to conduct de
novo review, its mandate to reach the correct result, and its historical
practice––do not prevent the court from according deference to
customs regulations.127 The Supreme Court did not, however,
consider the argument rejected in Universal Electronics and Rollerblade
that the statutory presumption of correctness might require
deference by courts to Customs Service interpretations.128
Consequently, Haggar does not appear to displace the CAFC’s
conclusion in Universal Electronics and Rollerblade that the presumption
of correctness applies to factual determinations and does not support
deference to statutory interpretations.129
The Supreme Court’s determination that the unique mandate of
the CIT does not preclude Chevron analysis leaves an unanswered
question: how far does Chevron analysis go in customs cases? The
narrow holding of Haggar is limited to legislative regulations.130 In
fact, the case can be read to stand simply for the proposition that a
legislative regulation is binding on a court until and unless the court
determines that the regulation is invalid.131 Furthermore, according
to the treatise that the Court cited for the proposition that the
standard of review of customs regulations is consistent with Chevron
analysis, the use of Chevron analysis to review customs regulations
127. See id. at 391-93 (rejecting Haggar’s arguments that the CIT should not grant
deference to Customs’ interpretation).
128. See Universal Elecs., Inc. v. United States, 112 F.3d 488, 493 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(holding that the presumption of correctness applies to the presentation of evidence
and “has force only as to factual components of that decision”); see also Rollerblade,
Inc. v. United States, 112 F.2d 481, 484 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (holding that the
presumption of correctness is “irrelevant where there is no factual dispute between
the parties”). By treating Chevron analysis as “the usual rule,” the Supreme Court did
not need to consider in Haggar whether deference was warranted by the statutory
presumption of correctness, and in fact the government did not present this
argument in its briefs to the Court.
129. Post-Haggar decisions by the CIT have continued to limit the presumption of
correctness to factual issues. See Russell Stadelman & Co. v. United States, 83 F.
Supp. 2d 1356, 1358 n.4 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1999) (the “presumption [of correctness]
does not apply where the court is presented with a question of law in a proper
motion for summary judgment”); see also JVC Co. of Am. v. United States, 62 F. Supp.
2d 1132, 1136 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1999) (stating that “where, as here, a question of law is
before the Court on a motion for summary judgment, the statutory presumption of
correctness is irrelevant”).
130. See Haggar, 526 U.S. at 390 (holding that “regulations of an administering
agency warrant judicial deference”).
131. See Eleventh USCIT Judicial Conference, supra note 9, at 43-44 (comments by
Peter L. Strauss)
(“[M]y judgment [is] that Haggar has nothing to do with Chevron. It does
invoke the Chevron case for the analysis that has yet to be done. But a valid
regulation is law. That was the proposition that was ignored by the lower
courts . . . . [I]f the regulation is valid, it has the same force as a statute. . . .
You’re obligated to give it force, not deference, not weight. It is law. But
that’s a very narrow proposition.”).
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represents an exception to the general rule in customs litigation.132
According to the treatise, the CIT and CAFC should generally make
independent judgments on questions of law in judicial review under
the customs laws.133 Thus, Haggar may have done no more than
reaffirm a rule that is limited to customs regulations.
Some of the language in Haggar supports the conclusion that the
CIT would not defer to the agency’s interpretation unless a legislative
regulation is involved. As noted above, the Court stated that
regulations “establish legal norms” and “are part of [the] controlling
law,” as are “controlling statutes, rules, and judicial precedents.”134
The Court did not mention other administrative interpretations that
may set norms. Nor did it include administrative interpretations
other than regulations in the list of authorities to which a trial court
must conform its rulings (i.e., statutes, rules, and judicial
precedents).135 The Court also stated that “[d]eference can be given
to the regulations without impairing the court’s authority to make
factual determinations, and to apply those determinations to the law,
de novo.”136 This language suggests that agency interpretations that
involve questions of fact or mixed questions of law and fact would not
be entitled to deference, because such interpretations could impair
the CIT’s authority to make de novo determinations.
Nevertheless, the Court’s references to “legal norms” and
“controlling law” does not exclude the possibility that the agency’s
position on a question of law could set a legal norm even if not
embodied in a regulation.137 Even opponents of Chevron analysis in
customs litigation may need to concede that the CIT’s statutory
mandates to conduct de novo review (which is actually a mandate to
base its decision on the record before the court) and to reach the
132. See REED , supra note 30, at 288.
133. Id. at 289. The same page of the Reed treatise was cited in Haggar. See 526
U.S. at 393. The other authorities cited by the Supreme Court to show that the
historical practice in customs litigation was not entirely uniform do not contradict
this conclusion. See id. The sentence from Vowell v. United States, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch)
368, 372 (1809), seems, if anything, to be an early statement of the concept of
Skidmore-type deference, particularly since the Court held in Vowell that the
government’s action was inconsistent with the statute and the government’s own
prior interpretation of the statute. See id. at 372. The countervailing duty case, Zenith
Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U.S. 443 (1978) (cited in Haggar, 526 U.S. at 393),
supports the conclusion that deference is not necessarily inconsistent with de novo
review, but does not illustrate the historical practice in customs cases. See id. at 457.
134. Haggar, 526 U.S. at 391.
135. See id. (emphasizing that the issue in Haggar was “whether the regulations are
part of the controlling law”).
136. Id.
137. Indeed, Bruce Forrest suggested that, under Haggar, judicial review must give
“‘proper effect’ to the ‘legal norms’ established . . . [and] not just those involving
issues addressed by regulations.” Forrest, supra note 31, at 7.
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correct result do not conclusively address whether the CIT is to make
its own independent interpretations of ambiguous statutory
provisions. The de novo record before the court, like the presumption
of correctness, might relate solely to factual elements of the dispute
and not issues of statutory interpretation. In addition, the “correct
result” of interpreting a statute may be that Congress intended to
authorize the agency to determine how gaps and ambiguities should
be resolved.
By leaving open the questions of whether and to what extent
Chevron may apply to other statutory interpretations by the Customs
Service, Haggar failed to achieve what was undoubtedly the
government’s larger goal of providing an authoritative determination
that Chevron governs customs cases in general. Instead, the resolution
of this question would need to await further litigation after Haggar.
Within three months after the Supreme Court decided Haggar, the
CAFC addressed one of the principal questions remaining after
Haggar––whether Customs Service ruling letters would receive
Chevron analysis.138 The CAFC’s decision indicates that it understood
Haggar to have limited application in classification cases beyond
regulations, for it concluded “that Haggar, and thus Chevron
deference, does not extend to ordinary classification rulings.”139 The
court’s reasons for this conclusion will be discussed below.140 While
the authors of this Article agree with the result in Mead, it remains
true that the CAFC’s case law on the applicability of Chevron does not
appear to be entirely consistent. Indeed, as already noted, the
Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Mead to address the issue of
whether customs interpretations in the form of ruling letters should
be accorded Chevron deference.141
To develop the approach
recommended here, the following sections of this Article undertake a
broader examination of the applicability of Chevron analysis in de novo
judicial review after Haggar.
II. JUSTIFICATION AND L EGITIMACY OF CHEVRON ANALYSIS
The preceding Part showed that the Supreme Court’s decision in
Haggar has a narrow holding that offers little guidance on the
applicability of Chevron analysis in de novo judicial review beyond the
138. See Mead Corp. v. United States, 185 F.3d 1304, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 1999), cert.
granted, 120 S. Ct. 2193 (2000).
139. Id. at 1307.
140. See infra notes 356-71 and accompanying text (discussing the CAFC’s reasons
for declining to defer to the classification ruling).
141. See Mead Corp., 185 F.3d at 307.
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specific situation of a notice-and-comment legislative regulation.142
Consequently, in an effort to seek further insight into the open
questions after Haggar, this section re-explores the theoretical
justifications for Chevron analysis.143 Based on this re-exploration, this
Article suggests that the importance of Chevron is not the outcome
that reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous agencyadministered statutes are controlling, but the creation of a
presumption that Congress intended reasonable agency interpretations
of ambiguous agency-administered statutes to be controlling. This
Article further suggests that this presumption must be rebuttable
where the justifications for the presumption are absent.
A. The Presumption of Delegation Under Chevron
In Chevron, the Court stated that where Congress has “explicitly left
a gap for the agency to fill,” there is “an express delegation of
authority to the agency.”144 In other instances, said the Court, “the
legislative delegation [i.e., the delegation of legislative authority] to
the agency” may be “implicit rather than explicit.”145 This reasoning
indicates that the justification for allowing an agency to make a
binding interpretation of a statute it administers is that Congress
delegated a portion of its law-making or legislative authority to the
agency, and the agency’s resolution of silence or ambiguity through
its interpretations represents an exercise of delegated legislative
authority.146 Thus, a threshold question under Chevron is whether the
statute being interpreted is administered by an agency, as opposed to
142. See supra notes 126-37.
143. See generally 1 DAVIS & P IERCE, supra note 2, at 107-31 (discussing Chevron
analysis in general); Anthony, Which Interpretations, supra note 20 (analyzing basis for
Chevron analysis in context of specific interpretive formats); Antonin Scalia, Judicial
Deference of Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 D UKE L.J. 511 (setting out Justice
Scalia’s interpretation of Chevron). For empirical studies of the application of
Chevron analysis, see, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, Shedding Light on Chevron: An Empirical Study
of the Chevron Doctrine in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 15 YALE J. ON REG . 1 (1998); Peter
H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of Federal
Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 984, 1026; Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron:
Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaking in Reviewing Agency Interpretations of Statutes, 73
TEX . L. REV. 83 (1994).
144. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 844 (1984).
145. Id.
146. See, e.g., Anthony, Which Interpretations, supra note 20, at 26 (“Chevron . . . calls
for a reviewing court to find an appropriate delegation . . . .”); Scalia, supra note 143,
at 516 (“[T]he theoretical justification for Chevron” is Congress’ intent to
“confer[] . . . discretion upon the agency . . . .”).
But see Cass R. Sunstein,
Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 467 (1987) (arguing that a
different rule should be applied when there is an ambiguity as opposed to when
Congress has purposely left a gap for agency resolution).
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a statute creating a private right of action enforced by the courts.147
The Supreme Court’s 1996 decision in Smiley v. Citibank (South
Dakota), N.A.148 expressed the idea of implicit delegation of legislative
authority as the “presumption” that Congress delegated legislative
authority in an agency-administered statute that contains
ambiguities.149 Justice Scalia’s opinion, written on behalf of a
unanimous Court, states that:
We accord deference to agencies under Chevron . . . because of a
presumption that Congress, when it left ambiguity in a statute
meant for implementation by an agency, understood that the
ambiguity would be resolved, first and foremost, by the agency, and
desired the agency (rather than the courts) to possess whatever
150
degree of discretion the ambiguity allows.

Justice Scalia also suggested the concept of a presumption of
delegation in a 1989 law review article.151 In it, he explained that preChevron decisions made a statute-by-statute assessment of whether
Congress intended to authorize an agency to make a controlling
interpretation of an ambiguous statute.152 In contrast, “Chevron . . .
replaced this statute-by-statute evaluation . . . with an across-the-board
presumption that, in the case of ambiguity, agency discretion [to
make controlling interpretations] is meant.”153
147. Chevron does not apply where the statute provides for litigation in court in
the first instance, as in a criminal statute or where a private right of action exists. See
Adams Fruit Co., Inc. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 649 (1990) (stating that to interpret a
statute creating a private right of action, “we need not defer to the [agency’s] view of
the scope of [the statute] because Congress has expressly established the Judiciary
and not the [agency] as the adjudicator of private rights of action arising under the
statute”); Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 177 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(“[T]he vast body of administrative interpretation that exists . . . is not an
administrative interpretation that is entitled to deference under [Chevron]. The law
in question, a criminal statute, is not administered by any agency but by the courts.”);
Kelley v. EPA, 15 F.3d 1100, 1108-09 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (holding that the agency may
not regulate an issue which has been specifically left to the judiciary).
148. 517 U.S. 735 (1996).
149. See id. at 740-41.
150. Id.
151. See Scalia, supra note 143, at 516 (arguing that Chevron’s justification is a
function of Congress’ intent to confer discretion upon the agency). Although the
Court’s decision in Smiley v. Citibank was unanimous, it is unclear whether the
remaining Justices interpret the “presumption of delegation” as broadly as Justice
Scalia does. See infra notes 170-77 and accompanying text (discussing case law
indicating that the presumption of delegation is rebuttable).
152. See Scalia, supra note 143, at 516 (asserting that the pre-Chevron decisions
resolved “on a statute-by-statute basis” whether a statutory ambiguity represented
Congress’ failure to express its intent clearly or Congress’ decision to delegate the
matter to the agency).
153. Id.; see also Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE
L.J. 969, 978-79 (1992). Merrill states that:
Under the pre-Chevron regime, not every agency decision would qualify for
deference in the face of an ambiguous statute. . . . Chevron . . . adopt[ed] . . .
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The “presumption of delegation” means that Chevron analysis
becomes the “default rule” or usual standard for reviewing the
agency’s interpretation of an agency-administered statute.154 But
acknowledging that Chevron creates a presumption invites the
question of whether it is rebuttable and, if so, how? For this purpose
it is helpful to consider the reasoning of Chevron in more detail and
examine why the Court chose to adopt a presumption of delegation.
Chevron presented several justifications for the presumption of
delegation or reasons that such a presumption is reasonable. The
same considerations have been discussed as possible justifications for
allowing agencies to make controlling statutory interpretations.155 In
contrast, this Article views the considerations discussed in Chevron as
justifications for creating the presumption of delegation, whereas the
Congress’ delegation of authority is the only justification for allowing
an agency’s interpretation to be controlling.156
Chevron identified three justifications supporting the presumption
of delegation:
(1) The “agency expertise” justification
As suggested by several passages in Chevron, it is a reasonable
generalization that where a “regulatory scheme is technical and
complex,” resolving ambiguity in a regulatory statute may require
“more than ordinary knowledge respecting the matters subjected to
agency regulations,”157 and agencies are better suited to the task
because “[j]udges are not experts in the field.”158

a presumption that whenever Congress has delegated authority to an agency
to administer a statute, it has also delegated authority to the agency to
interpret any ambiguities present in the statute.
Id.
154. See id. at 977 (using the term “default rule” and suggesting that “deference is
the default rule” under Chevron).
155. See infra notes 158-68 and accompanying text (articulating these
justifications).
156. See Anthony, Which Interpretations, supra note 20, at 26; Scalia, supra note 143,
at 516. Cf. Bowen v. Georgetown Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988) (“[A]n
administrative agency’s power to promulgate legislative regulations is limited to
authority delegated by Congress. . . .”).
157. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 844 (1984).
158. Id. at 865; see also Laurence H. Silberman, Chevron—The Intersection of Law &
Policy, 58 GEO. W ASH. L. REV. 821, 822 (1990) (remarking that the expertise rationale
grew out of a sense that the agencies as independent of the executive branch could
“gain and dispense neutral nonpolitical expertise in their task of regulating
industries or segments of the economy”). According to Justice Scalia, agency
expertise is not a persuasive theoretical justification for allowing agencies to make
controlling interpretations because agencies are legally subordinate to courts. See
Scalia, supra note 143, at 514.
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(2) The “policymaking” justification
This justification posits that when Congress leaves a gap or
ambiguity that cannot be resolved by the traditional tools of statutory
interpretation, “the resolution of that ambiguity necessarily involves
policy judgment” and “[u]nder our democratic system, policy
judgments are not for the courts but the political branches.”159
Therefore, democratic interests are served better if filling the gap or
resolving the ambiguity is left to the executive agency rather than the
courts.160 Implicit in this rationale is that the agency, being part of
the executive branch, is more democratically accountable than the
judiciary and therefore should make policy decisions needed to fill
any statutory gaps.161 In Chevron, the Court stated that it had
consistently deferred to the agency when interpretation of an
ambiguous statute involved “reconciling conflicting policies”162 and
that the agency’s interpretation “is entitled to deference [where] . . .
the decision involves reconciling conflicting policies.”163 In contrast,
“Judges . . . are not part of either political branch of the
Government.”164
(3) The “reasoned decisionmaking” or “appropriate format”
justification
This justification is based on the Court’s observation in Chevron
that “the agency considered the matter in a detailed and reasoned
fashion.”165 This justification was satisfied in Chevron because the
interpretation in issue was embodied in a legislative regulation,166
which was subject to the statutory notice-and-comment procedure.167
Accordingly, Professor Robert Anthony has advocated that “[i]t
159. Id. at 515.
160. See Merrill, supra note 153, at 978 (explaining that, unlike the agencies, the
courts “are not part of either political branch” and have “no constituency”).
161. See id. at 978-79 (referring to this factor as “democratic theory” and
explaining that “agency decisionmaking is always more democratic than judicial
decisionmaking because all agencies are accountable (to some extent) to the
President, and the President is elected by the people”); see also John F. Manning,
Constitutional Structures and Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96
COLUM. L. REV. 612, 690-91 (1996) (explaining why “less representative courts”
should defer to “more representative agencies”). Justice Scalia criticizes this
“separation of powers” or “policy making” approach as a justification for allowing
agencies to make controlling interpretations because one of the traditional
principles of statutory interpretation is the consideration of statutory purposes. See
Scalia, supra note 143, at 515.
162. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844 (citation omitted).
163. Id. at 865.
164. Id. at 865-66.
165. Id. at 865.
166. See id. at 840-41 (discussing promulgation of the challenged EPA regulations
in the Federal Register).
167. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1994) (setting out notice and comment procedure for
regulations); see also, e.g., 1 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 2, at 287-376 (chapter
discussing rulemaking procedure).
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seems plain that agency interpretations . . . must be the product of
reasoned decisionmaking in order to be deemed sufficiently
reasonable to command Chevron acceptance.”168
B. Rebutting the Presumption of Delegation Under Chevron
At least two Supreme Court decisions support the view that the
Smiley “presumption of delegation” is or should be rebuttable.169
Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett170 indicates that the presumption does not
exist where Congress, although assigning an agency to administer the
statute, creates a private right of action for enforcement. In Adams,
an interpretation by the Department of Labor did not pre-empt a
private right of action of farm workers.171 The Court rejected
application of Chevron to the interpretation because the adjudication
of the private rights of action was a matter strictly within the
judiciary’s power.172 The Adams judicial enforcement exception was
applied, and possibly extended, in Kelley v. EPA.173 In Kelley, the D.C.
Circuit did not defer to an agency’s statutory interpretation defining
the limits on a private litigant’s potential liability under a private right
of action.174 Although the EPA regulation was arguably less offensive
than the restriction of the private right of action in Adams, the court
applied the Adams rule that where Congress creates private rights of
action, it designates the judiciary and not the agency as the
adjudicator of the scope of liability.175
168. Anthony, Which Interpretations, supra note 20, at 50.
169. See Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638 (1990); Martin v. Occupational
Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144 (1991).
170. 494 U.S. 638 (1990).
171. See id. at 650-51.
172. See id. at 649 (rejecting the view that the lack of language addressing preemption creates a gap “that Congress intended the Department of Labor to fill”).
173. 15 F.3d 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
174. In Kelley, the court examined the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act (“CERCLA”), 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (1994). See id. at
1103. CERCLA empowered the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) to
manage and provide for the cleanup of hazardous substances released into the
environment. See id. In addition, it authorized private parties and the EPA to bring
civil actions independently “to recover costs associated with the clean up of
hazardous wastes from those responsible for contamination.”
Id. at 1103.
Conflicting judicial decisions arose as to who could be liable in a private civil action
to recover cleanup costs. See id. Responding to the confusion, the EPA promulgated
regulations, which articulated various parties’ potential liability. See id. Petitioners
challenged the EPA’s ability to define the scope of liability because the statute
created a private right of action and argued that such a decision belonged only to a
federal court. See id. at 1104-05, 1107.
175. See id. at 1108 (holding that deference is withheld “if a private party can bring
the issue independently to federal court under a private right action”). Judge Wald
has suggested that Kelley “can be read more broadly as refusing to apply Chevron
deference when the issue in question specifically concerns judicial enforcement of a
statute.” Patricia M. Wald, Judicial Review in Midpassage: The Uneasy Partnership
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Further support for the idea of a rebuttable presumption is found
in Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n.176 In Martin,
the Supreme Court explained that “historical familiarity [with the
pertinent statute] and policymaking expertise account in the first
instance for the presumption that Congress delegates interpretive
lawmaking power to the agency rather than to the reviewing court.”177
By linking the existence of delegation to the “expertise” and
“policymaking” justifications for the presumption, the Court’s
reasoning in Martin suggests that there is not an irrebuttable, acrossthe-board presumption that lawmaking authority is delegated to every
agency that administers a statute; rather, the presumption can be
rebutted if the expertise and policymaking justifications are absent.178
Scholarly evaluations of Chevron also support the view that the
Smiley presumption of delegation should be rebuttable. A 1985
article by Professor Colin Diver contended that “[a]gencies . . . come
in such a wide variety of shapes, sizes, and functions that one hesitates
to venture even modest generalizations about their ability” to
interpret statutes.179 In much the same vein, Professor Cynthia Farina
Between Courts and Agencies Plays On, 32 T ULSA L.J. 221, 244 (1996). Another
commentator has pointed out that “Kelley manifests the D.C. Circuit’s intention to
keep the principle announced in Marbury alive in the post-Chevron era . . . [by
making] clear that the court will not defer to an administrative agency’s statutory
interpretation if doing so would threaten the role of the judiciary.” Christopher J.
Hayes, Kelley v. EPA: Judicial Review of Statutory Interpretations of Administrative
Agencies, 63 GEO . WASH. L. REV. 641, 664 (1995).
176. 499 U.S. 144 (1991).
177. Id. at 153; see also id. at 151 (stating that the presumption exists “[b]ecause
applying an agency’s regulation to complex or changing circumstances calls upon
the agency’s unique expertise and policymaking prerogatives . . .”).
178. Strictly speaking Martin did not involve Chevron analysis but the closely
related rule that “an agency’s construction of its own regulations is entitled to
substantial deference.” See id. at 150 (citing Lyng v. Payne, 476 U.S. 926, 939 (1986)
and Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1965)); see also Bowles v. Seminole Rock &
Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945) (seminal case on deference to agency’s construction
of its own regulations). The Court’s analysis in Martin, however, focused on the
powers delegated to the agency “[b]ecause applying an agency’s regulation to
complex or changing circumstances calls upon the agency’s unique expertise and
policymaking prerogatives, we presume that the power authoritatively to interpret its
own regulations is a component of the agency’s delegated lawmaking powers.” Id. at
151.
179. Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpetations in the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L.
REV. 549, 592 (1985). Although a full examination of Professor Diver’s position is
beyond the scope of this article, he provided a “template against which to assess the
comparative institutional competencies of courts and agencies as statutory
interpreters.” Id. at 552. Subject to his hesitancy to make modest generalizations,
Professor Diver advocated a presumption that a reviewing court should defer to an
agency’s interpretation of a statute it administers. See id. at 552 (concluding that
when Congress has endowed an agency with significant policymaking responsibility,
courts should presumptively defer to that agency’s statutory interpretation).
Professor Diver’s article was virtually contemporaneous with Chevron, thereby
preceding the onslaught of Chevron literature, but perhaps not fully appreciating the
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has suggested that for purposes of governmental legitimacy, it is
necessary to look to a plurality of institutions (i.e., courts as well as
administrative agencies) rather than any single institution.180
Professor Farina also criticizes the generalization that an
administrative agency’s decisions can be deemed to be
“policymaking” by a politically accountable branch of the
government.181 For this reason, the presumption or default rule that
agencies are always acting as delegated legislators may be too
simplistic. There may be certain situations in which Congress would
select more searching judicial review as the mechanism of resolving
ambiguities in agency-administered statutes. The expertise of an
agency and its political accountability are important as they shed light
on whether Congress would have delegated part of its responsibility
to the agency.182
In sum, this Article proposes that the absence of one or more of
the three justifications for the presumption of delegation underlying
Chevron analysis causes the presumption to be rebuttable. Whether
legislative authority has been delegated to the agency—or whether to
rebut the presumption of delegation—must be considered in light of
the institutional framework for administration of the particular
regulatory regime, the purpose of the specific statute in issue, and the
specific format in which the agency’s interpretation appears.183 For
significance of Chevron’s two-step analysis. The “deference” of which Professor Diver
spoke was not the “extreme” position “that an administrative interpretation is
decisive as to the statute’s meaning,” id. at 565, but the Skidmore-like idea that
“[c]ourts exercise independent judgment on the meaning of a statute, but in so
doing, they give a special recognition to the agency’s views” in that “[t]he fact that a
particular interpretation bears the administering agency’s imprimatur counts in its
favor, but not decisively.” Id. at 566.
180. See Cynthia R. Farina, The Consent of the Governed: Against Simple Rules For a
Complex World, 72 C HI.-KENT L. REV. 987, 988 (1997) (“No single mode of democratic
legitimation can serve to mediate between the conflicted, protean . . . will of the
people . . . . No single institution [suffices] . . . .”).
181. See id. (asserting that the “pro presidential” literature, which posits that there
is a will of the people to which the executive branch responds, is not descriptively
accurate). Farina argues for a balance between the judiciary’s role and that of the
agency and posits that Chevron is too simplistic to set that balance in every given
situation. See id. at 1023 (noting that judicial review has been controversial because it
is seen as contributing to “regulatory ossification on one hand and contributing to
the legitimation of the regulatory process on the other”).
182. See supra notes 157-64 and accompanying text (discussing the expertise and
political accountability for policy making rationales); cf. Cynthia R. Farina, The ‘Chief
Executive’ and the Quiet Constitutional Revolution, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 179, 181-83 (1997)
(arguing that deference to an agency is legitimated by the fact that the agency is an
instrument of the executive’s enforcement power); Silberman, supra note 158, at 822
(discussing the agency expertise rationale).
183. Recently, in Christensen v. Harris County, 120 S. Ct. 1655 (2000), the Supreme
Court (over the objections of Justice Scalia who concurred in the result for different
reasons), rejected the application of Chevron analysis to an interpretation contained
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the reasons discussed in Parts III, IV, and V below, the customs laws
are an administrative area in which rebutting the presumption of
delegation is warranted in many instances.184
III. DELEGATION AND THE INSTITUTIONS OF CUSTOMS
ADMINISTRATION
Whether Congress delegated legislative authority to the Customs
Service must be considered in light of the institutional framework
surrounding the customs laws.185 The institutional framework may
also reveal whether the expertise justification for Chevron exists.
This Part of the Article examines the justification supporting the
Chevron/Smiley presumption of delegation that the agency, but not
the court, is an expert in the complex regulatory regime. Section A
illustrates the Supreme Court’s recognition that this generalization
may not apply where Congress has created a so-called “splitenforcement” administrative regime.186
In such a regime,
administrative responsibility is divided between an administrative
agency, with legislative and enforcement powers, and an
administrative tribunal, with responsibility for adjudicating contested
cases.187 In a split-enforcement model, both the agency and the
tribunal are experts; therefore, a case-by-case evaluation is needed to
determine where Congress intended to delegate the authority to
resolve statutory gaps and ambiguities.188 As developed in Section B
below, the institutional structure surrounding customs statutes is, or
has at least evolved from, a “split-enforcement model” in which both
the agency and the specialized reviewing court, the CIT, are
responsible for administering the customs laws.189
Thus,
in a format other than a regulation. In Christensen, the proffered interpretation was
put forth in an agency opinion letter. Justice Scalia in his concurrence claimed that
the letter represented “the authoritative view of the agency” and thus was entitled to
Chevron deference. See id. at 1665.
184. See infra Parts III, IV, and V (discussing the institutional framework of
customs administration, the purposes served by customs statutes, and the interpretive
formats used by the Customs Service).
185. See infra Part III.B (analyzing the split-enforcement institutional framework
for customs enforcement).
186. See infra Part III.A (discussing the split-enforcement model of
administration).
187. See generally George Robert Johnson, Jr., The Split-Enforcement Model: Some
Conclusions from the OSHA and MSHA Experiences, 39 ADMIN. L. REV. 315 (1987)
(examining the split-enforcement model in occupational and mine safety and
health).
188. See infra notes 216, 218, 221-24 and accompanying text; cf. Johnson, supra
note 187, at 348-49 (recommending that Congress clearly delineate an agency’s
responsibilities and that the courts ensure the limitations set are observed).
189. See infra Part III.B (discussing how the split-enforcement customs regime
affects Chevron analysis in customs litigation).

KELLYJCI.DOC

2000]

6/19/2001 10:48 AM

RECONCILING CHEVRON

1197

congressional allocation of power helps to inform the courts whether
Chevron analysis may apply.190
A. The “Split-Enforcement” Institutional Model
Congress may depart from the more common administrative
model that leads to the presumption of a delegation and Chevron
analysis.191
In a split-enforcement model, Congress allocates
enforcement and adjudicatory functions to different bodies.192
In Martin, the Supreme Court emphasized the need to consider the
specific institutional structure for administration of a particular
statute, especially where that structure does not follow the more
common administrative law model.193 The Court faced the issue of
190. Congress may grant a variety of powers and responsibilities to agencies.
Agencies may perform a combination of executive, judicial, and legislative functions.
See generally JOHN H. REESE , ADMINISTRATIVE LAW , PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE ch. 1, at 7479 (West 1995) (listing the range of judicial, executive, and legislative functions that
an agency can have). Most commonly agencies are empowered to:
[E]xecute (enforce) legislation and to announce its ‘executive’
interpretations of the legislation as interpretive rules, bulletins, or
guidelines; to make binding ‘legislative’ rules to clarify the legislative
meaning and supply needed detail; and to adjudicate cases arising within the
scope of the legislation and the auxiliary legislative and interpretive rules.
Id. at 76. Judicial review is provided for by the organic statute, but most typically is
given to a federal court of general jurisdiction; however, sometimes it may be given
directly to a Court of Appeals. See generally WILLIAM F. FUNK ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE, PROBLEMS AND CASES ch. 5, at 383-84 (1997) (generally
discussing the nature of judicial review of administrative decisions).
191. See Johnson, supra note 187, at 315 (stating that the split-enforcement model
contrasts with the more frequently used arrangement of housing all
administrative/regulatory functions in one agency).
192. For a discussion of the split-enforcement structure, see generally Johnson,
supra note 187. See also Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 499
U.S. 144 (1991)(discussing the OSHA split-enforcement regime); Garvey v. National
Transp. Safety Bd., 190 F.3d 571, 573 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (“The Federal Aviation Act . . .
establishes a split-enforcement regime in which the FAA has regulatory and
enforcement authority, while the NTSB acts as an impartial adjudicator.”); Beverly
Health & Rehabilitation Serv., Inc. v. Feinstein, 103 F.3d 151, 152 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(“Enforcement of the NLRA’s prohibition against unfair labor practices is
accomplished through a split-enforcement system, assigning all prosecutorial
functions to the General Counsel of the NLRB and all adjudicatory functions to the
Board.”) (citing National Labor Relations Bd. v. United Food & Commercial
Workers Union, Local 23, 484 U.S. 112, 123-28 (1987)); Secretary of Labor v. Mutual
Mining, Inc., 80 F.3d 110 (4th Cir. 1996) (split-enforcement between the Secretary of
Labor and the Federal Mine Safety & Health Review Commission created by the
Federal Mine Safety & Health Act of 1977); Hinson v. National Transp. Safety Bd., 57
F.3d 1144, 1147 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (discussing the Federal Aviation Act’s splitenforcement scheme); Department of Labor v. Barnes & Tucker Co., 969 F.2d 1524
(3d Cir. 1992) (split-enforcement between the Director of the Office of Workers’
Compensation Programs, United States Department of Labor and the Benefits
Review Board, United States Department of Labor, under the Federal Mine Safety
and Health Act).
193. See Martin, 499 U.S. at 154-55 (contrasting the adjudicative powers of a
traditional agency with a unitary structure to that of the Occupational Safety and
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deference in a “split-enforcement” institutional framework under the
Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA).194 Under OSHA, the
Secretary of Labor is responsible for setting and enforcing workplace
standards,195 while an independent administrative tribunal, the
Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission,196 is responsible
for adjudicatory functions.197 The enforcement process under OSHA
begins when a Department compliance officer issues a citation to an
employer.198 If the employer chooses to contest the citation, the
matter is referred to the Commission.199 Based on the findings of fact
in an evidentiary hearing, the Commission may affirm, modify, or
vacate the Secretary’s decision.200 In the administrative proceeding
leading to the Court’s decision in Martin, the Secretary and the
Commission reached reasonable but conflicting interpretations of an
ambiguous agency regulation.201
On judicial review of the
Commission’s decision, no one disputed that the court owed
deference to “an agency interpretation.”202 The question was whether
the Secretary or the Commission was authorized to make the
authoritative interpretation of the OSHA regulations.203
Health Review Commission under OSHA).
194. Occupational Health and Safety Act (OSHA) of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1994
& Supp. IV 1998).
195. See id. § 655(a).
196. See id. § 661.
197. See id. § 651(b)(3).
198. See id. § 658.
199. See id. § 659(c).
200. See Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144,
148 (1991) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 659(c)) (describing the procedure used by the
Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission when carrying out its
adjudicatory functions under OSHA).
201. See id. at 148-50.
202. See id. at 149-50.
203. Deference to an agency interpretation of its own regulations raises some
interesting twists beyond the scope of this Article. The principle that an agency is
entitled to deference in interpreting its own regulations actually precedes Chevron.
See Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 413-14 (1945) (stating that
when a court is interpreting an administrative regulation, it must look to the agency’s
construction of the regulation if the meaning is in doubt); accord Lyng v. Payne, 476
U.S. 926, 939 (1986) (“Moreover, the Court of Appeals’ holding runs roughshod
over the established proposition that an agency’s construction of its own regulations
is entitled to substantial deference.”); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965)
(“When faced with a problem of statutory construction, this Court shows great
deference to the interpretation given the statute by the officers or agency charged
with its administration.”); Martin, 499 U.S. at 150 (“It is well established that an
agency’s construction of its own regulations is entitled to substantial deference.”)
(internal quotations omitted). Under Seminole Rock, the reviewing court must sustain
a plausible agency interpretation of a regulation by the agency. See Seminole Rock, 325
U.S. at 414 (stating administrative interpretations are controlling unless they are
obviously incorrect). However, deference under Seminole Rock does not implicate the
same allocation of power question as both Chevron and Haggar. Compare infra note
203 and accompanying text, with supra notes 5-16 and accompanying text, and supra

KELLYJCI.DOC

2000]

6/19/2001 10:48 AM

RECONCILING CHEVRON

1199

Although the Court acknowledged that “it is necessary to take
account of the unusual regulatory structure established by the Act,”204
it ultimately recognized that the Secretary, not the Commission, was
in the best position to interpret OSHA regulations authoritatively.205
The Secretary promulgated the standards and, therefore, could
better reconstruct their purpose.206 Additionally, the responsibility
for day-to-day enforcement meant that “the Secretary comes into
contact with a much greater number of regulatory problems than
does the Commission, which encounters only those regulatory
episodes resulting in contested citations.”207 Therefore, the Court
believed that the Secretary had superior expertise.208
This
combination of “historical familiarity and policymaking expertise”209
led the Court to infer that Congress vested interpretive power in the
Secretary as “the administrative actor in the best position to develop
these attributes.”210 The Court found further support for this
conclusion in Congress’ statement that it was “combining legislative
and enforcement powers in the Secretary” to make a single
administrative actor responsible for rulemaking and politically
accountable for the program as a whole.211 Accordingly, the Court’s
review of the structure and history of the statute led it to conclude
that the Secretary and not the Commission maintained the power to
interpret the OSHA regulations.212
Based on its conclusion regarding the allocation of interpretive
authority, the Court ruled that Congress delegated the Commission
“the type of non-policymaking adjudicatory powers typically exercised
by a court in the agency-review context.”213
This concept of
notes 102-25 and accompanying text (stating that under Seminole Rock, the court must
look to the agency construction of a regulation if the meaning is in doubt, while
under Chevron there is a two-step analysis and under Haggar there is the possibility of
de novo review). The notion that an agency may finish off the legislation under
Chevron and then be given great deference in its interpretations of its regulations
raises constitutional questions. See Manning, supra note 161, at 654-96 (arguing that
agency rulemaking and interpretative powers may constitute a violation of the notion
of separation of powers); see also Eleventh USCIT Judicial Conference, supra note 9, at 4041 (comments of Claire R. Kelly and Peter L. Strauss) (transcript on file with
authors).
204. Martin, 499 U.S. at 151.
205. See id. at 152.
206. See id.
207. Id.
208. See id. at 152-53.
209. Id. at 153.
210. Id.
211. Id. (citing S. REP. N O. 91-1282, at 8 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5175, 5184-85).
212. See id. at 152.
213. Id. at 154 (italics in original).
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adjudication, said the Court, authorized the Commission “to review
the Secretary’s interpretations only for consistency with the
regulatory language and for reasonableness,” together with “making
authoritative findings of fact and . . . applying the Secretary’s
standards to those facts in making a decision.”214
In its conclusion, however, the Court emphasized that the case
“deal[t] . . . only with the division of powers between the Secretary
and the Commission under [OSHA].”215 The Court observed that
“[s]ubject only to constitutional limits, Congress is free . . . to divide
these powers as it chooses, and we take no position on the division of
enforcement and interpretive powers within other regulatory
schemes that conform to the split-enforcement structure.”216
Consequently, Martin provides support for our position that Congress
may and does choose to allocate power in different circumstances
and that Chevron’s presumption of delegation might not apply in
every administrative context.
B. What Does “Split-Enforcement” Mean for Customs Interpretations?
The institutional framework for customs enforcement and
administration is, or at least has evolved from, a Martin-like splitenforcement regime. Although the CIT is an Article III court, it is
also the successor to an administrative tribunal within the
Department of the Treasury, the Board of General Appraisers, and
the CIT continues to possess the same powers and duties as the
Board.217 As a result, Martin raises significant questions regarding the
extent to which Congress delegated to the Customs Service the
authority to set norms to which the CIT must defer. As discussed,
Martin acknowledges that Congress could (subject to possible
constitutional limitations) allocate the interpretive and enforcement
responsibilities between the enforcement body (the Customs Service)
and the adjudicatory body (the CIT) in any manner it chooses.218
Thus, the a priori assumption that the Customs Service necessarily
should possess norm-setting authority is contrary to the Court’s
reasoning in Martin.
The Customs Service is unquestionably the agency responsible for
214. Id. at 154-55.
215. Id. at 157.
216. Id. at 158.
217. See supra Part I.A (discussing the historical antecedents and evolution of the
CIT); see also REED , supra note 30, chs. 2-6 (discussing the historical evolution of the
institutional framework of customs litigation).
218. See Martin, 499 U.S. at 158 (“[S]ubject only to constitutional limits, Congress
is free . . . to divide these powers as it chooses . . . .”).
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administering and enforcing the customs laws.219 Nevertheless, in the
customs regime, a presumption that Congress delegated general
legislative authority to the Customs Service fails to consider what
authority Congress intended to vest in the CIT and its predecessors
when it created those specialized tribunals for the purpose of
conducting de novo judicial review under the customs laws. The
existence of the CIT as a specialized court creates an institutional
framework under the customs laws in which authority is divided
between the Customs Service and the CIT. This split-enforcement
structure in customs law undermines one of the justifications for
Chevron analysis.
The evolution of the institutions of customs litigation has resulted
in an adjudicatory body with significant expertise. The legislative
history of the Customs Courts Act of 1980 acknowledged that the
Customs Court possessed “specialized expertise” in this area of law.220
In addition, the CIT’s jurisdiction is limited and exclusive.221 As
noted above, the Supreme Court in Haggar stated that the CIT’s
“expertise guides it in making complex determinations in a
specialized area of the law . . . .”222 Thus, the expertise justification for
Chevron is not as persuasive in the customs context as it might be in
other administrative law areas. In addition, the CIT’s powers support
the view that Congress did not intend Chevron to be the default rule
in all instances. Although the CIT’s powers to reach the correct
result and to conduct de novo review may not prevent legislative
regulations from being controlling, the CIT’s powers confirm the
existence of a split-enforcement model which at least suggests that
one should be able to rebut the presumption of a legislative
delegation necessary for Chevron analysis.
One could argue that the Customs Service, like the Secretary of
Labor in Martin, comes into contact with more issues of customs
administration in its day-to-day operations than the CIT does. Martin
suggests that the Customs Service might be better suited than the CIT
219. See generally 19 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2083 (1994) (organic statute of the Customs
Service).
220. See H.R. REP. NO. 96-1235, at 20 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3729,
3729-30 (stating that the Customs Courts Act of 1980 would create “a comprehensive
system of judicial review [under the customs and international trade laws] . . .
utilizing the specialized expertise of the United States Customs Court and the United
States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals.”); accord S. REP. N O. 96-466, at 2, 5
(1979) (referring to the “expertise . . . of the United States Customs Court.”).
221. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1581-1583 (1994).
222. United States v. Haggar Apparel Co., 526 U.S. 380, 382 (1999); see also
Kaplan, supra note 28, at 5 (supporting the view that the CIT is an expert in customs
law issues).
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to resolve statutory ambiguities.223 Martin also seems to indicate,
although this portion of its reasoning may be difficult to accept, that
it is conceivable to have an adjudicatory tribunal which makes de novo
findings of fact and applies those findings de novo to a set of legal
norms drawn, not only from statutes or regulations, but also from a
body of decisions by one of the adversaries appearing before the
tribunal.224 Finally, since Martin dealt with the allocation of
interpretive authority between agencies, one could argue that the
default rule of Chevron analysis is all the more warranted where the
adjudicatory body is a court rather than another agency.
Nevertheless, this Article argues that the reasoning in Martin does
not ultimately establish that the CIT is required to defer to
interpretations by the Customs Service. First, the broader holding of
Martin is simply that Congress may delegate authority as it sees fit.225
Second, the more narrow holding—that the interpretation of the
enforcement agency, not the adjudicatory body, was entitled to
Chevron analysis226—is arguably inapplicable in the customs context.
One reason the narrow holding should not apply stems from the
different purposes of the statutes involved. The statute in Martin,
OSHA, was a remedial statute intended to promote the safety and
health of workers, in which statutory interpretations require the
agency to balance the policy of protecting workers against a policy of
avoiding the imposition of unduly burdensome costs on employers.227
223. See Martin, 499 U.S. at 152-53 (stating that the “Secretary is in a better
position than is the Commission to reconstruct the purpose of the regulations in
question”).
224. This problem arises from the fact that the interpretation in Martin was an
interpretation of a regulation and was given deference, not under Chevron, but rather
under Seminole Rock, Udall and Lyng. See id. at 150 (stating “it is well established ‘that
an agency’s construction of its own regulations is entitled to substantial
deference.’”); see also Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945)
(indicating that “the ultimate criterion is the administrative interpretation, which
becomes controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the
regulation”); accord Lyng v. Payne, 476 U.S. 926, 939 (1989) (“Moreover, the Court of
Appeals’ holding runs roughshod over the established proposition that an agency’s
construction of its own regulations is entitled to substantial deference.”); Udall v.
Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1965) (“When faced with a problem of statutory
construction, this Court shows great deference to the interpretation given the statute
by the officers or agency charged with its administration.”). Thus, the agency
created the controlling law under Chevron via a regulation. Thereafter, under
Seminole Rock, it was entitled to controlling deference in interpreting its own
“legislation” in an informal adjudication. The authors believe that allowing an
agency to both write the law and then interpret it, even where a court must make de
novo findings, may raise serious constitutional problems. See Manning, supra note
161, at 626 (discussing some of these constitutional issues).
225. See Martin, 499 U.S. at 158 (stating that “subject only to Constitutional limits,
Congress is free, of course, to divide these powers as it sees fit”).
226. See id. (stating that the “reviewing court should defer to the Secretary”).
227. See Johnson, supra note 187, at 317-19 (providing a review of the
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As argued below, the principal customs laws are revenue statutes
whose interpretation may require a much more limited “policy
judgment.”228
A further reason to question Chevron as a default rule in customs
cases is the historical practice of independent judicial interpretation
of statutes in customs litigation. In Haggar, as noted earlier, the
Supreme Court stated that the historical practice in customs litigation
was not sufficiently uniform to indicate that deference to a customs
regulation would be inconsistent with the intent of Congress.229
Although the Court’s statement is accurate with respect to customs
regulations, there appears to be a uniform historical practice of
independent judicial interpretation of customs statutes where the
agency interpretation is embodied in some form other than a
regulation:
In the large majority of customs cases, the “agency interpretation”
was simply the decision by customs officials at the port of entry.
The officials’ decisions received the presumption of correctness,
but the specialized adjudicatory tribunals determined the law. The
legal principles used to interpret the tariff laws and fill statutory
gaps developed through judicial rather than administrative
230
precedent.

Comparable historical practice was lacking in Martin.231 Moreover,
in Martin the Court was able to draw inferences from the legislative
history that deference by the Commission to the Secretary’s
interpretation would promote Congress’ purpose.232 Analogous
indications of congressional intent in the customs area do not exist.
There is no indication in the Customs Courts Act of 1980 or any of
the post-Chevron customs and international trade statutes that
Congress intended to alter the existing standard of review on
questions of law in customs litigation or intended the CIT to defer to
Customs Service interpretations.233
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970).
228. See infra Parts IV.A-IV.B (comparing revenue purposes of the customs laws to
non-revenue purposes of other laws).
229. See supra notes 115-20 (discussing reasoning in Haggar that identified
precedents illustrating deference to the agency interpretations).
230. REED , supra note 30, at 284.
231. See Johnson, supra note 187, at 318-19 (discussing the enactment of OSHA
split-enforcement regime in 1970).
232. See Martin, 499 U.S. at 145 (stating that “dividing the power to make and
enforce standards from the power to make law by interpreting them would make two
administrative actors ultimately responsible for implementing the Act’s policy
objectives, an outcome inconsistent with Congress’ intent in combining legislative
and enforcement powers in the Secretary”).
233. See Customs Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-417, 94 Stat. 1727. One of the main
purposes of the Customs Court Act of 1980 was to minimize confusion over the
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A fourth reason to question the extent to which Congress
delegated to the Customs Service the authority to set norms is that
the volume of import transactions and number of legal issues makes
the Customs Service what Professors Davis and Pierce call a “mass
justice” agency.234 As noted by John Simpson, over fifteen million
customs entries are filed each year, usually with numerous line items
of separate merchandise, at almost 300 different ports.235 Moreover,
“[s]everal hundred laws apply to these imports, and decisions about
the applicability of these laws must be made quickly, some within a
few seconds.”236 Although Simpson argued that the “mass justice”
problem made it appropriate to achieve uniformity through
regulations (which would be entitled to Chevron analysis), the “mass
justice” problem also increases the likelihood of factual or legal error
by local officials. Consequently, it is appropriate to require a more
extensive mechanism of judicial review for correction of such errors
than in a regulatory regime where the procedures at the
administrative level are more thorough and could be expected to
yield more reliable results.237
Customs administration operates under a structure which is, or has
evolved from, a split-enforcement model. Congress delegated certain
authority to the Customs Service, but also created the CIT with broad
powers of de novo adjudication. Against the backdrop of broad
powers and history belonging to the CIT, it would be inappropriate
to infer that Congress generally intended the CIT and CAFC to defer
to the administrative decisions of the Customs Service under Chevron.
Instead, the CIT and CAFC should consider the purpose of the
particular customs statute in issue and the format of the Customs
respective jurisdictions of the district courts and the Customs Court and to reduce
the volume of litigation in the district courts by shifting the bulk of the import
related cases to the Customs Court. See S. REP. NO. 96-466, supra note 220, at 20.
234. See 1 DAVID & PIERCE, supra note 2, § 11.5, at 208-09 (discussing examples of
mass justice cases such as social security disability and Veterans Administration cases,
which involve hundreds of thousands of cases a year). Such mass justice cases
typically involve classes of numerous small and quick decisions which are not readily
susceptible to systems of precedents (i.e. a customs officer cannot be bound by
precedents in deciding whose bags to open). Cf. Eleventh USCIT Judicial Conference,
supra note 9, at 37-38 (comments of Ronald Gerdes) (“No one wants Customs to put
a lot of thought or time into its decisions. People want the decisions quickly.”).
235. See Simpson, supra note 28.
236. Id.
237. In addition to the “systemic” considerations mentioned in the text, a possible
additional reason for distinguishing Martin from much of customs litigation is that
Martin involved the interpretation of a regulation issued by the Secretary, rather than
the interpretation of the statute itself. As suggested earlier, deference to the unit
that drafted and promulgated a regulation may well be warranted for the purpose of
interpreting the regulation. See supra note 203 (discussing cases involving agencies’
interpretations of their own regulations).
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Service’s interpretation in determining whether Chevron analysis is
appropriate.
IV. FINDING A DELEGATION TO CUSTOMS GIVEN THE STATUTE
As discussed above, the history, expertise, and powers of the CIT in
the split-enforcement structure argue against a presumption that
Congress has delegated norm-making authority for all customs laws
and formats.238 Similarly, whether the “policy-making” justification
for the presumption of a delegation is present depends upon the type
of statute and what Congress intended. Before treating any statutory
ambiguity as an implicit delegation of norm-making authority, an
understanding of the congressional purpose in the regulatory
program is required.239 As Chevron itself is a rule of statutory
interpretation, additional interpretive principles, such as those
calling for a strict or liberal construction, are also helpful in
determining the scope of the policy role envisioned by Congress.
This Part discusses these principles in general in Section A, and then
examines them as applied to customs statutes more thoroughly in
Section B.240
A. General Interpretive Principles
General principles of statutory interpretation241 may be helpful in
understanding whether Congress implicitly delegated power to the
agency to fill gaps and resolve ambiguities.242 Statutes can be revenueraising, remedial, or public policy promoting. The breadth of the
interpretive license reflects, to some extent, the discretion found in

238. See supra Part III.B.
239. Cf. Sunstein, supra note 146, at 467 (arguing that a different rule should be
applied when there is an ambiguity as opposed to when Congress purposely left a gap
for agency resolution).
240. These interpretive principles may end the inquiry in step one of Chevron
analysis because, using these principles, the Court may find no “ambiguity.” See infra
Part IV.B.1 (discussing classification cases and suggesting that all or nearly all such
cases can be decided in step one of Chevron); see also Ohio v. United States Dep’t of
Interior, 880 F.2d 432 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (even though the agency was given
considerable latitude to use its expertise to set standards, the court relied on an
exhaustive search of the legislative history and statutory context and invalidated the
agency’s action under step one of Chevron).
241. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103
HARV. L. REV. 405 (1989) (discussing general interpretive principles).
242. Robert Gregory has suggested using legislative meaning to determine when a
gap is a delegation. See Robert J. Gregory, When a Delegation is Not a Delegation: Using
Legislative Meaning to Define Statutory Gaps, 39 CATH. U. L. REV, 725, 727 (1990). Our
proposal goes beyond the search for legislative meaning by seeking out such
meaning in the norms contained in the statutes themselves as well as the legitimacy
provided by a medium of communication.
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the statute. The more discretion, the more justification for a finding
that Congress sought to delegate policy making power to the
agency.243
Generally, statutes that impose tax obligations for raising revenue
are strictly interpreted against the government.244 The CAFC in
Anhydrides & Chemicals, Inc. v. United States245 recently discussed and
applied the “rule of construction of revenue statutes whereby unclear
or ambiguous [statutory provisions] have traditionally been resolved
in favor of the [taxpayer].”246 The court noted that “[t]his rule of
construction has applied at least since Justice Story’s explanation [in
an 1842 decision] that revenue statutes, which are neither remedial
nor an implementation of public policy, are in doubtful cases
construed in favor of the citizen, lest burdens be imposed beyond the
statutory revenue-producing purpose.”247 The CAFC concluded that
“the rule of strict construction of revenue statutes” remains a vital
principle of customs law.248
Unlike revenue-raising statutes, remedial statutes are generally
construed broadly in favor of those whom the law is intended to
243. Cf. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 865 (1984) (reasoning that the policy objectives were such that it was
appropriate for the agency to balance the competing interests).
244. See generally 3A NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND S TATUTES AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 66.01 (5th ed. 1992) (stating that tax laws are to be construed in
favor of the taxpayer); Smietanka v. First Trust & Sav. Bank, 257 U.S. 602, 605 (1927)
(construing a tax provision in favor of an unborn beneficiary where the statute did
not explicitly provide for the taxation of such).
245. 130 F.3d 1481 (Fed. Cir. 1997). This case was decided after the CAFC’s
decision in Haggar but before the Supreme Court’s decision in the same case, and
the CAFC reiterated its decision in Rollerblade that the statutory presumption of
correctness allocates the burden of proof on factual issues but is not authority for
deference to the Customs Service’s statutory interpretation. See supra notes 85-92 and
accompanying text (discussing the CAFC’s case law prior to the Supreme Court’s
decision in Haggar).
246. See Anhydrides, 130 F.3d at 1485.
247. Id. (citing United States v. Wigglesworth, 28 F. Cas. 595, 596-97 (C.C.D. Mass.
1842).
[It is] a general rule in the interpretation of all statutes, levying taxes or
duties upon subjects or citizens, not to extend their provisions, by
implication, beyond the clear import of the language used, or to enlarge
their operation so as to embrace matters, not specifically pointed out,
although standing upon a close analogy. In every case, therefore, of doubt,
such statutes are construed most strongly against the government, and in
favor of the subjects or citizens, because burdens are not to be imposed, nor
presumed to be imposed, beyond what the statutes expressly and clearly
import. Revenue statutes are in no just sense either remedial laws or laws
founded upon any permanent public policy, and, therefore, are not to be
liberally construed.
Id. The CAFC also cited Hartranft v. Wiegmann, 121 U.S. 609, 616 (1887) (noting that
questions of doubt are resolved in favor of the importer because duties are never
imposed on ambiguous interpretations).
248. Anhydrides, 130 F.3d at 1486.
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protect.249 In determining whether a statute is remedial and thus
accorded a liberal interpretation, courts look to the intrinsic nature
of the legislation and the enacting body for confirmation that the
statute was intended to be remedial.250 Judges sometimes invoke a
liberal construction because the statute is ameliorative by nature, or
protective of particular persons.251 Likewise, statutes which promote
public health often are given a liberal interpretation.252
The principal policy reflected in customs revenue statutes is the
raising of government revenue.253 For example, the purpose of the
customs valuation statute is to set forth the methods by which the
Customs Service will determine the value of merchandise for customs
purposes.254 Once the value is set, the Customs Service applies the
249. See, e.g., Blake A. Watson, Liberal Construction of CERCLA Under the Remedial
Purpose Canon: Have the Lower Courts Taken a Good Thing too Far?, 20 HARV . ENVTL. L.
REV. 199, 233 (1996) (noting that remedial statutes protect and promote the public
good). Remedial statutes dealing with certain areas, like worker safety, worker
compensation, age, race, and gender discrimination, are accorded a liberal
interpretation. They are interpreted broadly in order to favor the group whom the
law is intended to protect. See, e.g., Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,
§§ 2-17, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602, 602-08 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634
(1994)). This statute should be accorded a liberal interpretation. See Morelli v.
Cedel, 141 F.3d 39, 43 (2d Cir. 1998) (stating that as remedial and humanitarian
legislation, this act should be “construed liberally”).
250. But see Antonin Scalia, Assorted Canards of Contemporary Legal Analysis, 40 CASE
W. RES . L. REV. 581 (1990) (challenging the use of general interpretative principles
on the grounds that they are indeterminate).
251. See 4 SINGER, supra note 244, § 71.02.
252. See id. (stating that courts have been committed to giving statutes enacted for
protection and preservation of public health liberal construction in order to
maximize the objectives); United States v. Antikamnia Chem. Co., 231 U.S. 654
(1914) (noting that the purpose of the Food and Drug Act is to secure purity of food
and drugs and, hence, its provisions must be construed to effect this purpose). A
liberal interpretive approach is still subject to constitutional restraints such as equal
protection or due process; however, the benefits of public health law are generally
seen to outweigh the dangers of a liberal interpretation. See Baldwin County Bd. of
Health v. Baldwin County Elec. Membership Corp., 355 So. 2d 708 (Ala. 1978)
(finding that a state regulations intended to protect public health were
unconstitutional). But see Jones v. State Bd. of Med., 555 P.2d 399 (Idaho 1976)
(finding that a statute intended to protect public health was constitutional). A
liberal interpretation exists even in those cases where the statute imposes penalties,
including criminal penalties. See 4 SINGER, supra note 244, § 71.02; Johnson v.
Southern Pac. Co., 196 U.S. 1, 17 (1904) (holding that the circuit court of appeals’
construction of the act was too narrow even though such strictness was thought to be
required because of the act’s penal nature); Golden v. McCarty, 337 So. 2d 388 (Fla.
1976) (stating that the “enactment of statute was a lawful exercise of state police
power in regard to public health”). Public health statutes are typically administered
by agencies and often criticized for vagueness. See 3A, 4 SINGER, supra note 244,
§§ 60.02, 71.02.
253. Although an additional purpose of the customs revenue statutes is the
protection of American industries through high import duties, as a practical matter
the purpose of trade protection merges into revenue collection because
administration of protective tariffs involves little or no judgment beyond assessing
the import duties as required by the statute.
254. See Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1401a (1994) (defining how imported
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applicable rate of duty and collects the resulting duties.255
Generally speaking, revenue statutes do not depend on reconciling
competing interests or engaging in a cost-benefit analysis to the same
extent as remedial or public policy statutes. The “policy judgment”
often is limited to the judgment that taxes should be assessed as
Congress intended and should not be assessed as Congress did not
intend.256 This particular policy judgment warrants a separation of
functions between revenue collection and adjudication of contested
assessments. An agency charged with collection of revenue such as
the Customs Service is potentially, if not always, in an adversarial
position vis-à-vis taxpayers. Since the agency’s mission is viewed as
protecting the revenue of the United States, the phenomenon of an
administrative agency that is “captured” by the regulated interests
means that a revenue agency may to some extent be captured by
itself.257 The risk of “self-capture” by a revenue agency would also
explain the parallel existence, as the Supreme Court noted in
Haggar,258 of specialized courts in customs and income tax matters.259
B. Consideration of the Specific Statutory Norms in the Customs Context
1.

Classification
Since classification cases260 account for the clear majority of
customs litigation in the CIT, the question of whether Chevron applies

merchandise should be appraised).
255. See id. § 1500 (prescribing the Customs Service’s procedure for appraisement,
classification, and liquidation).
256. See supra notes 244-48 and accompanying text (illustrating how the courts
have given effect and interpreted revenue statutes).
257. Cf. Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L.
REV. 363, 371 (1986) (explaining that courts will defer less to agency’s
interpretations where they question whether the agency can be trusted not to expand
its power beyond the scope given to it by Congress). As stated by Joseph Kaplan,
there is a suspicion that the Customs Service’s “legal determinations lack the
disinterested evenhandedness of a decision made by an independent decision
maker.” Kaplan, supra note 28, at 8.
258. See United States v. Haggar Apparel Co., 526 U.S. 380, 394 (1999)
(comparing the expertise of the CIT to the expertise of the Tax Court).
259. Like the CIT, the Tax Court’s jurisdiction is limited to tax cases. See 26 U.S.C.
§ 7442 (1994). However, unlike the CIT, the Tax Court is an Article I court with
concurrent jurisdiction with the United States District Court and the United States
Court of Federal Claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1) (1994) (noting the courts’
concurrent jurisdiction); 26 U.S.C. § 7441 (1994) (establishing the United States Tax
Court under Article I of the Constitution). Although the existence of specialized
courts alone should not defeat the implicit delegation required for Chevron analysis,
it lends support to the view that Congress has special concerns for judicial review of
the statutes at issue.
260. As noted earlier, “classification” involves assigning imported goods to the
applicable provision of the tariff schedule. See ROSSIDES & MARAVEL, supra note 3.
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in customs litigation has its greatest practical importance in those
cases. This Article argues that in the absence of a pertinent customs
regulation, the considerations against Chevron analysis are strongest
with respect to Customs Service classification interpretations.
In most classification cases, the legal issue involves interpretation of
competing descriptions of merchandise found in chapters 1 through
97 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States
(HTSUS)261—the product nomenclature provisions of the tariff
schedule. It is questionable whether any “policy judgment” is
involved in nomenclature cases. Instead, the policy underlying
classification cases is that classification is to be based on the objective
application of elaborate rules of interpretation.262 Moreover, the
interpretive principles are revenue-neutral. The HTSUS does not
include the statutory interpretive rule found in earlier U.S. tariff
schedules which stated “if two or more tariff descriptions are equally
applicable to an article, such article shall be subject to duty under the
description for which the original statutory rate [of duty] is
highest . . . .”263 The omission of this interpretive rule from the
HTSUS indicates that Congress did not intend the Customs Service to
take the policy of protecting government revenue into consideration
when interpreting the tariff provisions.
The distinctive principles of statutory interpretation developed in
customs jurisprudence for classification cases are “a set of traditional
tools of statutory interpretation . . . [that] should enable the
reviewing court, the CIT, to make its own independent interpretation
261. The U.S. tariff schedule, the HTSUS, is based on an internationally uniform
system of product nomenclature known as the Harmonized Commodity Description
and Coding System, usually called simply the Harmonized System.
Each
participating country agreed to adopt the Harmonized System as the national tariff
statute. See International Convention on the Harmonized Commodity Description
and Coding System (Hein’s No. KAV 2260), opened for signature June 14, 1983. The
HTSUS was enacted in Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-418, §§ 1204-1212, 102 Stat. 1107, 1148-55 (codified in 19 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3012
(1994 & Supp. IV 1998)). The HTSUS itself is not actually codified at 19 U.S.C.
§ 1202 and, instead, is published as a separate document by the U.S. International
Trade Commission. See 19 U.S.C. § 1202 note (1994). Nomenclature classification
(the provisions of HTSUS chapters 1-97) bases the category assignment on the
description of the merchandise set out in the tariff. In addition to the product
nomenclature, the HTSUS includes special classification provisions in chapters 98
and 99 permitting, in specified circumstances, duty-free entry or partial duty-free
entry of goods which would otherwise be subject to a duty. This Article refers to
classification issues arising under chapters 98 and 99 as non-nomenclature
classification cases.
262. See infra notes 264-71 and accompanying text (summarizing the manner in
which classification is to be determined).
263. Compare General Headnote 10(d), Tariff Schedules of the United States, 19
U.S.C. § 1202 (1982) (repealed Dec. 31, 1988), with General Rules of Interpretation
1 through 6, HTSUS.
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of the tariff statute in all or nearly all cases.”264 Thus, rather than
reaching the question of whether deference is warranted under the
second step of Chevron analysis, the CIT can interpret the tariff
nomenclature and resolve the issue without finding any ambiguity.
Because the first step of Chevron analysis is indistinguishable from
ordinary statutory interpretation conducted by a court, the debate
over whether “Chevron deference” applies in classification cases may
well be academic.
It is beyond the scope of this Article to provide a comprehensive
primer on the legal method in classification cases.265 At a minimum,
it is appropriate to mention that the statute itself, in addition to the
individual product descriptions, includes the General Rules of
Interpretation, the Additional U.S. Rules of Interpretation, section
notes, and chapter notes.266
Important tools of statutory
interpretation include the “common meaning” doctrine,267 the
Explanatory Notes,268 and the court’s ability to “rely upon its own
understanding of the terms used, and . . . consult lexicographic and
scientific authorities, dictionaries, and other reliable information.”269
Another tool of statutory interpretation may be unique to customs
264. Proceedings of the Ninth Judicial Conference of the Court of International Trade, 161
F.R.D. 547, 644 (Nov. 16, 1994) (quoting the comments of Mr. Reed).
265. Baxter Healthcare Corp. v. United States, 182 F.3d 1333 (1999), provides a
succinct restatement of a number of interpretive principles. Outside of customs law
there is a general debate on the tools of statutory interpretation under step one of
Chevron analysis raging outside customs law. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of
Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845 (1992); William N.
Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621 (1990); Daniel A. Farber &
Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 423 (1988);
Michael Herz, Textualism and Taboo: Interpretations and Deference for Justice Scalia, 12
CARDOZO L. REV. 1663 (1991); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Supreme Court’s New
Hypertextualism: An Invitation to Cacophony and Incoherence in the Administrative State, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 749 (1995); Bernard Schwartz, “Shooting the Piano Player”? Justice Scalia
and Administrative Law, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 1 (1995); Nicholas S. Zeppos, Justice Scalia’s
Textualism: The “New” New Legal Process, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1597 (1991).
266. See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418,
§ 1204(a), 102 Stat. 1107, 1148 (codified in a note preceding 19 U.S.C. § 1202)
(providing that the rules of interpretation and the section and chapter notes are part
of the statute).
267. See Baxter Healthcare, 182 F.3d at 1337 (“Absent contrary legislative intent,
HTSUS terms are to be ‘construed [according] to their common and popular
meaning.’”).
268. The Explanatory Notes are a four-volume publication by an international
organization called the World Customs Organization (“WCO”), formerly called the
Customs Cooperation Council, that administers the Harmonized System Convention.
See CUSTOMS CO- OPERATION C OUNCIL, HARMONIZED COMMODITY DESCRIPTION AND
CODING SYSTEM EXPLANATORY N OTES (1986). “The Explanatory Notes constitute the
[WCO’s] official interpretation of the Harmonized System. They provide a
commentary on the scope of each heading . . . .” H.R. CONF. REP . N O. 100-576, at
549 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1547, 1582.
269. Baxter Healthcare, 182 F.3d at 1338.
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jurisprudence. In classification cases, “the testimony of witnesses as
to [the] common meaning [of a tariff term] may be received,”270 and
although “courts are not bound by the testimony of witnesses as to
the common meaning of a statutory term, . . . the uncontradicted
testimony of competent witnesses as to the common meaning of such
term is entitled to great weight.”271
The CAFC reemphasized the importance of step one of Chevron in
its 1998 decision in Timex V.I. Inc. v. United States,272 in which it stated
that:
We do not fulfill our duty to say what the law is [under] Marbury v.
Madison . . . by merely agreeing to [the agency’s] interpretation of
the statutory provision at issue if it is ‘reasonable,’ regardless of
whether we think it correct. Rather, before granting an agency’s
statutory interpretation such great deference (commonly referred
to as ‘Chevron’ deference), we must first carefully investigate the
matter to determine whether Congress’s purpose and intent on the
question at issue is judicially ascertainable. Only if, after this
investigation, we conclude that Congress either had no intent on
the matter, or that Congress’s purpose and intent regarding the
matter is ultimately unclear, do we reach the issue of Chevron
273
deference.

Similarly, in Haggar, the Supreme Court appears to have indicated
that the CIT may well be able to resolve any ambiguities in the first
instance, noting that “the expertise of the Court of International
Trade . . . guides it in making complex determinations in a
specialized area of the law; it is well positioned to . . . determine if the
preconditions for Chevron deference are present.”274 This passage
endorses the idea that the CIT’s expertise makes it well positioned to
make an independent determination of whether the statute is silent
or ambiguous, before deferring even to a legislative regulation.
Thus, even if Chevron analysis applies, the court begins by applying
the traditional tools of statutory interpretation, and the first step in
Chevron analysis remains an important part of the court’s method of
review. This Article suggests that the court will resolve the vast
270. American Express Co. v. United States, 39 C.C.P.A. 8 (1951); accord West
Bend Co. v. United States, 892 F.2d 69, 71 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“As an aid in
determining the meaning of a term or word used in a particular tariff provision, a
court may consider . . . expert testimony.”); Pistorino & Co. v. United States, 82 Cust.
Ct. 168 (1979) (“On the meaning of the term ‘shrine,’ the court heard the testimony
of two members of the Roman Catholic clergy . . . .”).
271. United States v. Scruggs-Vandervoort-Barney Dry Goods Co., 18 C.C.P.A 279,
282-83 (1930).
272. 157 F.3d 879 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
273. Id. at 881.
274. United States v. Haggar Apparel Co., 526 U.S. 380, 394 (1999).

KELLYJCI.DOC

1212

6/19/2001 10:48 AM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:1167

majority of classification cases through its own independent
interpretation of the statute.275 Only in the relatively unusual
classification case like Haggar, which did not involve interpretation of
the product nomenclature, but rather a special classification
provision setting conditions on eligibility for a partial duty reduction,
might the issue of deference arise. For the same reasons, any
potential impact of Haggar on Chevron analysis in customs cases
appears to be in non-classification cases.
2.

Customs valuation
After classification, customs valuation276 represents one of the
principal categories of cases involving customs revenue. If Justice
Story’s distinction between revenue statutes and remedial or publicpolicy statutes were to be followed, one would expect the customs
valuation statutes to be strictly construed against the government.277
Consequently, valuation might be an area in which it would be wrong
to presume that legislative authority was delegated to the Customs
Service, except where it has issued regulations.
Indeed, the CAFC reaches many valuation decisions by exercising
independent judgment on the interpretation of the statute, often
without citing Chevron. For example, the CAFC’s decision in Nissho
Iwai Am. Corp. v. United States278 involved a relatively longstanding
Customs Service interpretation of the valuation statute.279 At issue was
whether the “price actually paid or payable for the merchandise when
sold for exportation” was the price from a manufacturer to a
middleman or from a middleman to the importer.280 Under the
Customs Service’s interpretation of the phrase “sold for exportation,”
the sale from the foreign manufacturer to a middleman was not “for
exportation.”281 The court set aside the agency’s interpretation—
without reference to Chevron—based on the court’s independent
analysis of the statute and case law precedents.282 The court found
that whether the manufacturer’s sale or the middleman’s sale would

275. See supra notes 264-71 and accompanying text (discussing the distinctive
interpretive principles used in classification cases).
276. See supra note 3 (explaining that valuation is the determination of the value
of imported goods for customs purposes).
277. See supra note 247 (indicating that ambiguous revenue statutes are to be
interpreted in light favoring the citizen).
278. 982 F.2d 505 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
279. See id. at 511 (referring to a Customs Service ruling letter published as C.S.D.
83-46, 17 Cust. B. & Dec. 811 (1983)).
280. See id. at 507-08 (citing Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1401a(b)(1) (1994)).
281. See C.S.D. 83-46, 17 Cust. B. & Dec. 811, 813 (1983).
282. See Nissho Iwai Am. Corp. v. United States, 982 F.2d 505, 509 (1992).

KELLYJCI.DOC

2000]

6/19/2001 10:48 AM

RECONCILING CHEVRON

1213

be used to appraise the imports depends on a case-by-case factual
analysis.283
In contrast, the CAFC apparently applied Chevron analysis in
customs valuation cases on three occasions.284 In one, Generra
Sportswear, the CAFC’s reasoning appears to conflict with the
Supreme Court’s reasoning in Haggar and the CAFC’s own discussion
in Nissho Iwai.285 In another case, Goodman Manufacturing, the CAFC’s
reasoning does not clearly explain whether the court was finding the
statute unambiguous or rejecting an unreasonable interpretation.286
Finally, the third case, Samsung Electronics, the agency’s interpretation
(of a regulation rather than the statute) was plainly the best
interpretation.287
In Generra Sportswear the CAFC unquestionably ruled that Chevron
governed its review of a Customs Service valuation decision.288 The
issue in the case was whether the importer’s payment for quota
charges, invoiced separately from the goods, was included in the
dutiable “transaction value.”289 Stating that the statute did not
“precisely address whether or not quota payments may be included in
transaction value,” the CAFC “determine[d] whether or not the
appraisal was based upon permissible construction of the statute.”290
The CAFC stated that the “term ‘total payment’ is all-inclusive” and
that “[a] permissible construction of the term ‘for imported
merchandise’ does not restrict which components of the total
payment may be included in transaction value.”291 Thus, the court
found that Customs could reasonably interpret the statute to say that
“the [quota-charge] payment properly may be included in
transaction value, even if the payment represents something other
than the per se value of the goods.”292
The decisions in Haggar and Nissho Iwai call into question the
283. See id.
284. See Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc. v. United States, 106 F.3d 376 (Fed. Cir. 1997);
Goodman Mfg. v. United States, 69 F.3d 505 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Generra Sportswear,
Inc. v. United States, 905 F.2d 377 (Fed Cir. 1990).
285. See infra notes 290-97 and accompanying text.
286. See infra notes 298-305 and accompanying text.
287. See infra notes 306-11 and accompanying text.
288. See 905 F.2d at 379 (citing Chevron).
289. See id. at 378. The transaction value is defined in relevant part to include the
“total payment . . . made . . . for the imported merchandise by the buyer to . . . the
seller.” Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1401a(b)(4)(A) (1994). Quota charges refer
to the cost of purchasing an export license needed for goods that are subject to
quantitative trade restrictions. See Generra Sportswear, 905 F.2d at 378 n.2 (citation
omitted).
290. Generra Sportswear, 905 F.2d at 379 (citations omitted).
291. Id. at 379-80.
292. Id. at 380.
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validity of Generra Sportswear. In Haggar, as noted earlier, the Court
explained that deference to a regulation would not “impair[] the
authority of the [CIT] to make factual determinations, and to apply
those determinations to the law, de novo.”293 In contrast, Generra
Sportswear upheld the reasonableness of the agency’s interpretation
because it would avoid burdening the Customs Service with factfinding responsibilities: “Congress did not intend for the Customs
Service to engage in extensive fact-finding to determine whether
separate charges, all resulting in payments to the seller in connection
with the purchase of imported merchandise, are for the merchandise
or for something else.”294 The CAFC in Generra Sportswear overlooked
the fact-finding responsibilities of the CIT and improperly sustained a
blanket interpretation of the law which eliminated the need for the
CIT to make de novo factual determinations, contrary to the role
identified for the CIT in the Haggar reasoning. Similarly, the CAFC’s
decision in Generra Sportswear conflicts with its reasoning in Nissho
Iwai, in which the CAFC interpreted the statutory term “when sold for
exportation” to require a case-by-case determination of facts.295
In Goodman Manufacturing, the CAFC interpreted a clause of the
Foreign-Trade Zones Act that granted an allowance for waste
generated during manufacturing operations in a foreign-trade zone,
thereby reducing the dutiable value of the merchandise withdrawn
from the zone.296 The CAFC prefaced its reasoning by citing Chevron
and stating that “we must determine whether Customs’s decision is
based on a permissible construction of the trade statutes.”297
Subsequently, it stated that “we agree . . . that the statute does not
explicitly prescribe a method for calculating the allowance for waste”
and, “[t]hus, in determining the meaning of this ambiguous statute, a
reasonable interpretation by the agency that implements it is entitled
to deference.”298 These passages apparently indicate that the court
293. United States v. Haggar Apparel Co., 526 U.S. 380, 391 (1999).
294. Generra Sportswear, 905 F.2d at 380.
295. See supra notes 282-83 and accompanying text (noting the CAFC’s adoption
of case-by-case analysis in Nissho Iwai).
296. Goodman Mfg. v. United States, 69 F.3d 505, 506 (1995). A foreign-trade
zone is a designated area that is treated as outside the customs territory of the United
States, where foreign merchandise may be manipulated before entering the customs
territory of the United States. See Foreign-Trade Zones Act, 19 U.S.C. § 81c(a)
(1994). Section 3 of the Foreign-Trade Zones Act, 19 U.S.C. § 81c (1994), grants an
allowance for recoverable waste when calculating the dutiable value of the
merchandise that will enter the customs territory.
297. Goodman Mfg., 69 F.3d at 508. The Customs Service’s interpretation in
Goodman Manufacturing was embodied in a private letter ruling issued to the
importer. See id. at 507.
298. Id. at 510.
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found the statute silent or ambiguous and that the court would
proceed to a determination under Chevron of whether the agency’s
interpretation was reasonable.
Immediately afterward, however, the court stated that “[s]tatutory
interpretation ‘is a holistic endeavor [in which a] provision that may
seem ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by the remainder of the
statutory scheme—because . . . only one of the permissible meanings
produces a substantive effect that is compatible with the rest of the
law.’”299 The court then ruled that the Customs Service incorrectly
interpreted the statute300 and that the court’s own interpretation was
the only way “to reconcile the statutory and regulatory language.”301
This portion of the court’s reasoning—particularly its statements that
the agency’s determination was “incorrect”302 rather than
“unreasonable” and that the court’s interpretation was the “only
approach”303—seems to say that the statute, when read in context, was
not ambiguous and that the court was able to make an independent
interpretation using traditional tools of statutory interpretation.
Thus, while some of the reasoning in Goodman Sportswear indicates
that Chevron analysis is used in valuation cases, other parts of the
reasoning support the view that the court will reach an independent
interpretation of valuation statutes without deference to the agency’s
position.
In Samsung Electronics,304 the CAFC relied on Chevron to defer to the
Customs Service’s interpretation of a regulation, which provided an
allowance for damage when determining the dutiable value of
damaged imported merchandise.305
Under the agency’s
interpretation, the regulation only applied where the damage caused
the merchandise to be lower in value than the merchandise ordered.
As the CIT explained, “the reasonableness of Customs’ interpretation
is illustrated by the hypothetical in which an importer buys irregular
[merchandise] . . . with an intention of selling [it] ‘as-is’ at discount
outlets.”306 The example seems so persuasive that the court could well
299. Id. (citing United Sav. Ass’n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assoc., 484 U.S. 365,
371 (1988)).
300. See id. at 510 (determining that the Customs Service’s valuation was
erroneous).
301. Id. at 511.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. 106 F.3d 376, 378 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
305. 19 C.F.R. § 158.12 (1990) (“Merchandise which is subject to ad valorem or
compound duties and found by the district director to be partially damaged at the
time of importation shall be appraised in its condition as imported, with an
allowance made in the value to the extent of the damage.”).
306. See Samsung Elecs., 904 F. Supp. 1403, 1405 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1995), rev’d on
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have sustained the Customs Service’s interpretation by making an
independent interpretation of the regulation. In fact, the importer
apparently did not strongly contest this interpretation. Samsung
Electronics, therefore, does not provide particularly strong support for
the use of Chevron analysis.307
In sum, the CAFC’s decisions in valuation cases do not appear to
adopt an entirely consistent approach to the use of Chevron analysis.
In the majority of valuation cases, the CAFC has made independent
interpretations of the statutes, and the principle of strictly construing
revenue laws militates against deference to a revenue agency.308 The
decision providing the clearest example of the use of Chevron analysis,
Generra Sportswear, appears to be flawed,309 while the reasoning in
Goodman Manufacturing makes it difficult to determine whether the
court truly applied Chevron or not.310
3.

Non-revenue customs and international trade laws
Thus far, the debate over Chevron analysis in customs litigation has
centered on the customs revenue statutes, involving classification,
value, and duty assessment cases. Although customs litigation under
statutes regulating imports for purposes other than revenue is less
common than classification and value litigation, their different
statutory purposes may lead to a different conclusion on whether
Chevron analysis is warranted.311 This question appears to lie in
relatively unexplored territory and perhaps further litigation will be
required to determine the precise contours of Chevron methodology

other grounds, 106 F.3d 376 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
307. It is also important to note that Samsung Electronics involved Customs’
interpretation of its own regulation rather than a statute. See id. (examining the
validity of the interpretation of Customs Service’s regulation 19 C.F.R. § 158.12
(1990)). Review of an agency’s interpretation of its regulations is governed by
Seminole Rock and not Chevron. See Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410,
414 (1945) (giving an agency’s interpretation “controlling weight unless it is plainly
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”); see also supra note 203 and
accompanying text (discussing the origins of deference to an agency’s interpretation
of its own regulations).
308. See supra notes 276-307 and accompanying text (outlining various valuation
cases addressing the varying applications of Chevron deference).
309. See supra notes 295-97 and accompanying text.
310. See supra notes 298-305 and accompanying text.
311. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 1304 (1994) (providing that foreign articles or containers
must be adequately marked to indicate the “country of origin”); 19 U.S.C. § 1526
(1994) (prohibiting the importation of merchandise bearing marks that infringe
American trademarks); 19 U.S.C. § 1595a (1994) (allowing seizure of merchandise
entering the country illegally); 19 C.F.R. pt. 12 (1999) (providing regulations
governing, among other classes of merchandise, goods made with convict labor,
immoral articles, sea otter skins, pre-Columbian artifacts, textile products, and
cultural property).
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in non-revenue customs litigation.312 Nevertheless, in two nonrevenue cases discussed below, the initial resort to Chevron analysis
does not appear to be objectionable.
In Arbor Foods Inc. v. United States,313 the Customs Service interpreted
the Foreign-Trade Zones Act to require a party seeking to enter sugar
syrup into a foreign-trade zone for storage to obtain approval from
the Foreign-Trade Zones Board before the merchandise was
admitted.314 The importer objected to obtaining Board approval
because it was aware of the Board’s belief that admission of the sugar
syrup would undermine the government’s quota system restricting
imports of sugar and, consequently, the importer expected the Board
to deny approval.315 The CAFC found that the statute was silent on
whether the Customs Service could lawfully require parties to seek
such approval from the Board and ruled that it would defer to the
Customs Service’s interpretation under Chevron if its interpretation
was reasonable.316 The court observed that the statute provided in
part that the Board “may at any time order the exclusion from the
zone of any goods . . . that in its judgment [are] detrimental to the
public interest, health, or safety.”317 In view of this discretionary
power conferred on the Board to exclude goods from zones, the
CAFC concluded that “Customs’ determination that it could require
[the importer] to obtain approval from the [Board] before it
admitted [the] sugar syrup into [the zone] represents a plausible
construction of the statutory scheme” and sustained the Customs
Service’s interpretation.318 Thus, Arbor Foods exemplifies the use of
Chevron analysis for the interpretation of a statute within a protective
regime for an import-sensitive industry.319
312. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 81b (1994) (creating zones that are legally outside the
customs territory of the United States, in which foreign goods may be manufactured
or manipulated).
313. 97 F.3d 534 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
314. See id. at 536. The importer had requested a formal ruling on the
admissibility of the goods by the Customs Service. Id. The Customs Service declined
to issue the requested ruling. Id. Instead, the Service responded by letter: “It is our
understanding that the Foreign-Trade Zones Board [(“FTZB” or “Board”)] has
concerns regarding the above proposed transaction. Consequently, you should
contact the Board to determine whether or not the operation will be permitted.” Id.
315. See id.
316. See id. at 538-39 (stating that the court would defer to a permissible
construction of the statute).
317. Id. at 539 (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 81o(c)).
318. See id.
319. See id. at 538-39 (applying Chevron deference to uphold Customs’
interpretation); see also discussion supra note 253 (discussing the purpose of the
customs revenue statutes). Nevertheless, one can view Arbor Foods as a case where the
court misapplied Chevron by accepting a “reasonable” agency interpretation instead
of independently interpreting the statute in step one of Chevron. Arbor Foods, 97 F.3d
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Another non-revenue area, foreign policy, was implicated in the
CAFC’s decision in Springfield Industries Corp. v. United States,320
involving the interpretation of the trade embargo imposed as part of
economic sanctions against South Africa under the Anti-Apartheid
Act.321
In granting Chevron deference to the administrative
interpretation of the statute published in the Federal Register,322 the
CAFC stated that the “‘rule of deference’ is particularly strong when,
as here . . . the agency action is in the foreign affairs area.”323 The
decision in Springfield Industries arose from a statute delegating
authority to the executive branch in matters involving foreign policy,
an area in which delegations are broadly construed in favor of the
executive.324 Strictly speaking, however, Springfield Industries should
not be considered a customs case at all, because the Office of Foreign
Assets Control (OFAC) principally administered and interpreted the
statute. In this case, the role of the Customs Service was merely to
enforce the embargo as instructed by OFAC.325
In conclusion, general principles of statutory interpretation and
the purposes of important customs statutes indicate that Congress is
unlikely to have intended every ambiguity to represent an implied
delegation of law-making authority to the Customs Service. The
absence of significant policy considerations in classification and
at 538-39 (deferring to agency interpretation when the statute is silent or
ambiguous). The court concluded that the Board’s powers under the statute were
consistent with Customs’ decision to defer to the Board’s judgment. The court did
not reach that conclusion by interpreting the statute independently; it simply labeled
its conclusion “Chevron deference” rather than explicate the meaning of the statute
on its own. See id. (failing to address statutory language independently). Thus, Arbor
Foods illustrates one of the great dangers of Chevron: where there is a reasonable
agency interpretation available, courts may abdicate their responsibilities to interpret
the statute in the first instance. This danger is all the more apparent when one sees
that the format for the agency interpretation in Arbor Foods was merely an
information letter from Customs Headquarters. See id. at 536-37 (delineating the
letters at issue).
320. 842 F.2d 1284, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
321. See 22 U.S.C. § 5070 (1994) (barring iron and steel imports from South
Africa).
322. See 51 Fed. Reg. 41,911 (Nov. 19, 1986) (delineating the types of steel subject
to the embargo).
323. Springfield Indus., 842 F.2d at 1286.
324. See, e.g., id. at 1285 (noting that the “‘rule of deference’ is particularly strong
when, as here . . . the agency action is in the foreign affairs arena”). See generally
REED , supra note 30, ch. 11 (addressing “discretion-oriented” import statutes under
which the scope of judicial review is especially limited).
325. See Springfield Indus., 842 F.2d at 1285 (acknowledging the central role of the
OFAC). See also REED , supra note 30, at 335-36 (discussing adoption of Chevron
methodology in Springfield Industries). Reed treats Springfield Industries not as a
customs case but as a decision under a “discretion-oriented” trade statute, which the
author describes as “a discrete body of judicial precedent . . . where statutes delegate
broad discretionary authority in import matters to the executive branch” for various
non-revenue purposes. Id. at 313.
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valuation statutes militates against a finding of an implied delegation,
whereas the policy considerations involved in statutes implicating
special protective regimes or foreign policy seem to warrant a finding
of an implied delegation.
V. THE FORMAT OF THE CUSTOMS SERVICE’ S INTERPRETATION
Whether a court will apply Chevron analysis to an agency
interpretation will depend in part on the format in which the agency
issues the interpretation. Agencies can issue interpretations in a
variety of formats including regulations, ruling letters, guidelines,
and penalty decisions. This Part examines whether the interpretative
format reveals that the agency considered the issue in a detailed and
reasoned manner before making its interpretation.326 Section A
generally explains the relationship between the format under
consideration and a congressional delegation. Section B specifically
examines whether the customs ruling letter as a format should be
entitled to Chevron analysis. Section C reviews other interpretive
formats and whether they supply a sufficient opportunity for the
reasoned decision making that Chevron analysis may apply.
A. Considering the Interpretative Format in General
In addition to applying general interpretive principles and
examining the statutory purpose, the CIT or CAFC should evaluate
the interpretation’s format in determining whether it should defer to
a statutory interpretation by the Customs Service under Chevron. On
this issue, this Article endorses the views of Professor Anthony,327 who
has emphasized the need to consider the format in which an agency’s
statutory interpretation is made to determine whether the
interpretation warrants Chevron analysis.328 He argues that “the
agency cannot express its interpretation in any format it pleases and
expect to command the courts’ acceptance.”329 Instead, the agency’s
interpretation must derive from authority “to pronounce

326. See supra Part II (assessing the doctrinal foundations of Chevron deference to
agency interpretations).
327. See Anthony, Which Interpretations, supra note 20, at 34 (indicating that the
form of the interpretation must conform to that required by the delegation).
Professor Anthony argues that in order to bind the public, the agency must rely upon
a separate delegation of authority to set norms in a particular interpretive format.
See id. at 36.
328. See id. at 36-37 (citing example where an agency’s interpretation may have
been reasonable, but in a format “through which it had no delegated power to speak
with the force of law.”).
329. Id. at 36.
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interpretations in the format chosen by the agency,”330 and therefore “the
key question in each case is whether Congress delegated the authority
to issue interpretations with the force of law in this format.”331
At first glance, it may seem that whether the format is “legislative”
or “interpretive” would determine whether Chevron analysis is
warranted. Such labels, however, do not establish whether Congress
has delegated the power to issue legislative regulations.332 Thus, the
distinction between legislative rules and interpretive rules333 does not,
by itself, determine whether a particular interpretation should
receive deference.334 Even where the agency’s interpretation is
embodied in a legislative rule, one must first establish that a
delegation exists.335 Then the Court must ensure the agency properly
followed notice-and-comment procedures.336 Thus, the format of a
rule (in effect the label given by the agency) is not determinative on

330. Id. at 34 (italics in original).
331. Id. at 42 (italics in original). See Christensen v. Harris County, 120 S. Ct. 1655
(2000) (rejecting the application of Chevron analysis to an interpretation contained
in a format other than a regulation, namely, an agency opinion letter).
332. Also, as Professor Asimow has pointed out, the difference between legislative
and interpretive rules in practice may not be as stark as it seems in theory. Members
of the public do indeed feel bound by the interpretations of the agency even if they
are not “legislative rules.” See Michael Asimow, Nonlegislative Rulemaking and
Regulatory Reform, 1985 DUKE L.J. 381, 384 (suggesting that “[m]ost members of the
public assume that all agency rules are valid, correct, and unalterable.”).
333. A legislative rule is an administrative statute that creates legal norms and
binds the public. Interpretive rules, however, are merely guidelines for the agencies
and do not bind the public, theoretically. See id. at 383 (citing numerous definitional
cases). See, e.g., Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 154
(1982); Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979); Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S.
416, 425 n.9 (1977).
334. See generally 1 DAVIS & P IERCE, supra note 2, at 233-37 (discussing the four
main differences between legislative rules and interpretive rules and justifications for
only applying Chevron deference to legislative rules). Justice Breyer has noted that
“the ‘delegation’ way of looking at deference tends to blur any clear distinction
between ‘legislative’ and ‘interpretive’ rules.” See Breyer, supra note 257, at 371-72.
335. For example, the need to establish that a delegation exists is reflected in the
Court’s reasoning in Haggar. See Haggar, 526 U.S. at 387 (discussing the Customs
Service’s statutory authority to classify imported goods). The agency’s delegated
authority is not always set by the parameters of its rulemaking power. In fact, as one
commentator has observed:
Congress routinely delegates rulemaking power to agencies, thereby inviting
agencies to act in a legislative capacity and to promulgate standards when
implementing a statutory scheme. Despite this delegation, Congress may
still have staked out a substantial claim to lawmaking control over the
standards the agency will establish through rulemaking. Congress may invite
the agency to complete the legislative puzzle, but it may also specifically
indicate what puzzle pieces the agency cannot use and maybe some, or even
many, of the pieces the agency must use.
Gregory, supra note 242, at 726.
336. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1994) (describing notice-and-comment procedures under
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)).
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whether Congress has delegated authority to the Customs Service.337
The format can only tell: (1) whether the rule satisfies the noticeand-comment procedures required for most legislative rules,338 and
(2) whether Congress’ implied delegation would promote the norms
underlying Chevron analysis for a given statute in light of the statute’s
purpose and the institutional structure surrounding the statute.
This Article’s goal in reviewing the potential interpretive formats
employed by the Customs Service is to evaluate whether they are
suitable for Chevron analysis. We argue that when the delegation of
authority is implied rather than express, one needs to take into
consideration the normative goals of legitimacy339 (or lawfulness),
efficiency,340 and clarity (or predictability).341 As a general matter, the
goal of lawfulness is promoted when the court makes its own,
independent interpretation of the statute without deference to the

337. See, e.g., Batterton v. Marshall, 648 F.2d 694, 704-06 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(recharacterizing agency action as a “rule” requiring formal notice-and-comment
despite contrary agency labels). See also Asimow, supra note 332, at 390 (discounting
the reliability of agency labels to determine the proper characterization of the rule).
Another relevant factor in distinguishing between legislative and interpretive
rules is the specificity with which an agency’s delegated legislative power has
been expressed. In many cases, legislative rulemaking power is conferred by
specific statutory provision. In other instances, however, a statute provides
only a general rulemaking authority applicable to the entire statute . . . .
Id. at 395 (citations omitted).
338. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1994) (prescribing what agency actions are subject to
notice-and-comment procedures). Professor Asimow comments that the exemption
from notice-and-comment procedure for interpretive rules seems to have been
written with the legal effect, “not the substantial impact test in mind.” See Asimow,
supra note 332, at 399. Thus, the agency’s intent to create a legislative rule seems
paramount in the exception—but this still begs the question of whether Congress
should be understood to have implicitly delegated the authority to the agency.
339. See Scalia, supra note 143, at 513-14 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
(1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803), to accentuate that it is the judiciary’s responsibility to
determine the law); Cynthia K. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power
in the Administrative State, 89 C OLUM. L. REV. 452, 498-99 (1989) (arguing that
“constitutional necessity” requires judicial encroachment on Chevron deference). As
Professor Monaghan has pointed out “[t]here is no hint of [judicial] acquiescence in
a reasonable but contrary administrative interpretation of the relevant congressional
legislation in Marbury’s much quoted pronouncement . . . .” Henry P. Monaghan,
Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 2 (1983). Agency
interpretations often vacillate between constructing the law and interpreting it. See
Sunstein, supra note 21, at 2075 (discussing the realignment of separation of powers
post-Chevron).
340. Cf. Silberman, supra note 158, at 823 (“Chevron’s importance is its
recognition that, expertise aside, the agencies, nevertheless, maintain a comparative
institutional advantage over the judiciary in interpreting ambiguous legislation that
the agencies are charged with applying.”).
341. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., “The Rule of Law” as a Concept in Constitutional
Discourse, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 7-9 (1997) (discussing generally the value of stare
decisis and predictability); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Reconciling Chevron and Stare Decisis,
85 GEO. L.J. 2225, 2237-48 (1997) (explaining the values furthered by stare decisis).
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agency.342 The goal of efficiency, in contrast, is generally promoted
when the court defers to the agency, since a framework in which the
agency’s initial decision is the final decision is more efficient than
one in which the initial decision is subject to review.343 Finally, the
goals of clarity or predictability often depend upon the procedural
safeguards and public notice accompanying the agency’s
interpretation.344 As suggested earlier, the decision should be
reached “through a process that encompassed public or adversarial
participation”345 (a criterion that notice-and-comment regulations
satisfy), and the decision must be adequately disseminated to the
public which is bound by the decision (again, a criterion that noticeand-comment regulations satisfy).346 Interpretations in the form of
regulations, such as the one in Haggar, are most likely to set legal
norms.347 As discussed below, however, the most important open
question after Haggar is whether Customs Service ruling letters
should be considered for Chevron analysis as well.348
B. Customs Rulings and the CAFC’s Decision in Mead
Many decisions by the Customs Service fall into the category of
“rulings.”349 This category encompasses decisions in the following
342. See supra note 339.
343. See also Eleventh USCIT Judicial Conference, supra note 9, at 37-38 (comments of
Ronald Gerdes) (“No one wants Customs to put a lot of thought or time into its
decisions. People want the decisions quickly.”).
344. See Anthony, Which Interpetations, supra note 20, at 46 (indicating that the
informal, advisory, or tentative interpretive expression “will not ordinarily be a tool
that Congress intends to use to implement its delegation of law-making authority”
because such interpretations are not arrived at through an adversarial process).
345. Id.
346. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (“Except to the extent that a person has actual and
timely notice of the terms thereof, a person may not in any manner be required to
resort to, or be adversely affected by, a matter required to be published in the
Federal Register and not so published.”).
347. See United States v. Haggar Apparel Co., 526 U.S. 380, 381 (1999) (noting
that customs regulations, like other regulations defining legal relations between
government and regulated entities, were congressionally authorized to clarify the
rights and obligations of importers).
348. See id. (focusing only on Customs Service regulations). In Christensen v. Harris
County, 120 S. Ct. 1655 (2000), the Supreme Court recently signaled that
interpretations not in the form of regulations, such as agency guidelines or policy
manuals, are generally not entitled to Chevron analysis. Christensen appears, however,
to have left open whether Chevron analysis is appropriate for interpretations issued in
informal adjudications—the issue the Court will confront in Mead.
349. See 19 U.S.C. § 1625(a) (1994) (requiring the publication of rulings and
decisions). The majority of Customs’ written interpretations come in the form of
“rulings” in which Customs responds to:
written requests from importers and other interested parties for rulings or
information setting forth, with respect to a specifically described transaction,
a definitive interpretation of applicable law, or other appropriate
information.
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formats:
(1) Prospective rulings by Customs Headquarters or, in the case of
classification rulings, by Customs Headquarters, National
350
Commodity Specialists, or officials at a local port.
351

(2) Internal advice rulings by Customs Headquarters.
(3) Rulings by Customs Headquarters on an application for further
352
review of a protest concerning a completed customs transaction.
(4) Rulings by Customs Headquarters on a domestic interested
party’s petition challenging the classification or valuation of
353
imported merchandise.

All of the foregoing are informal adjudications that contain
elements relating to specific parties and facts.354 They require finding
of facts, as well as an application of the law to the facts.
Simultaneously, however, interpretive rulings may announce or
prescribe general norms of future applicability for all parties. A large
number of ruling letters are made available to the public by the
Customs Service.355
They constitute a body of administrative
precedent which is widely referred to and relied upon by the
importing community for guidance in predicting how customs laws
will be applied to their import transactions. And, consequently,
customs rulings provide guidance on how importers should declare
the classification and dutiable value of merchandise at the time of

A ruling may be requested under Part 177 of the Customs Regulations (19
C.F.R. Part 177) by any person who, as an importer or exporter of
merchandise, or otherwise, has a direct and demonstrable interest in the
question or questions presented in the ruling request, or by the authorized
agent of such person.
What is a Ruling Letter (and How Do I Get One?) (last modified Jan. 17, 2000)
<http://www.customs.treas.gov/impoexpo/impoexpo.htm>.
350. 19 C.F.R. pt. 177 (1999) (regarding the issuance of rulings to importers and
other individuals by the Customs Service).
351. Id. § 177.11 (addressing “internal advice” requests for advice from Customs
Headquarters by field offices).
352. 19 C.F.R. pt. 174 (1999) (discussing Customs Service protests).
353. 19 U.S.C. § 1516 (1994) (providing for petitions by domestic interested
parties); 19 C.F.R. pt. 175 (1999) (“This part sets forth the procedures applicable to
requests by domestic interested parties for the classification and rate of duty
applicable to designated imported merchandise”).
354. See STRAUSS, supra note 5, at 178-82 (discussing adjudication as a format for
policy making).
355. See United States Customs Service, Rulings and Regulations/ Ruling Letters Issued
by the ORR (visited July 2, 2000) <http://www.customs.gov/imp-exp/rulings/
hq.htm>. The Customs Bulletin gives important changes in rulings that may affect
many importers. Most rulings cite past rulings as well. Some would argue, however,
that many of these rulings, although used in a precedential manner by Customs,
contain little or no reasoning in them whatsoever. See Eleventh USCIT Judicial
Conference, supra note 9, at 35-36 (written question from audience read by Professor
Strauss).
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entry.
In Mead Corp. v. United States,356 decided three months after the
Supreme Court decided Haggar, the CAFC answered, at least for the
time being, how Haggar would affect customs litigation where the
Customs Service’s interpretation was embodied in a ruling letter
issued by Customs Service Headquarters.357 The CAFC concluded
“that Haggar, and thus Chevron deference, does not extend to
ordinary classification rulings.”358
The CAFC’s first reason for its conclusion emphasized the
procedural safeguards or public participation in formulation of the
agency’s interpretation. The court noted that regulations are issued
“under the procedural rigors dictated by the Administrative
Procedure Act,” notably including the required notice-and-comment
proceeding, “during which the interested public can ‘participate in
the rule making through submission of written data, views, or
arguments.’”359 Having “endure[d] this process, [a regulation] thus
represents a reasoned and informed articulation of Customs’
statutory interpretation.”360 But the court found that “[i]n contrast,
such procedural safeguards do not accompany typical Customs
rulings,”361 because the process lacks public debate.362
Second, the court found that regulations are distinguishable from
rulings, because “Customs rulings do not carry the force of law and
are not, like regulations, intended to clarify the rights and obligations
of importers beyond the specific case under review.”363 Instead, a
Customs ruling is “confined to the specific facts of and parties to the
particular transaction at issue”364 and “merely interprets and applies
Customs laws to ‘a specific set of facts.’”365
Third, the CAFC noted that the Supreme Court had drawn an
356. 185 F.3d 1304 (Fed. Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 2193 (2000).
357. Id. at 1306-07 (stating the substantive issue to be whether imported dayplanners, a loose-leaf ring binder containing a calendar, a section for daily notes, and
a section for names, plus a notepad fitting in the rear flap of the day-planner’s cover,
are classified under the tariff provision for “diaries . . . , bound” or, instead, under
the tariff provision for “other” articles “similar” to diaries). The Customs Service
determined in a ruling letter that the day-planners are “diaries . . . , bound.” The
CIT held that the Customs Service’s classification was correct, but the CAFC reversed
on appeal. See id.
358. Id. at 1307.
359. Id. (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1994)).
360. Id.
361. Id.
362. See Mead Corp., 185 F.3d at 1307 (citing the Customs ruling process as an
example of one not involving public debate and discussion).
363. Id.
364. Id. (citation omitted).
365. Id. (quoting 19 C.F.R. § 177.1(d)(1) (1998)).
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analogy in Haggar between customs matters and tax matters.366
Applying this analogy, the CAFC noted that “Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) interpretive rulings . . . ‘do not have the force and
effect of regulations’”367 and, consequently, the CAFC “ha[d] not
afforded them Chevron deference.”368 The CAFC concluded that
“Customs’ classifications rulings are in some ways an even less
formalized body of interpretation than IRS revenue rulings,”369
because they are not all required to be published, and do not all
emanate from Customs Headquarters.370 These “parallels between
IRS Revenue Rulings and Customs rulings” identified by the CAFC
“further convince[d] [the court] that the latter, like the former, do
not require Chevron deference.”371
This Article agrees with the result in Mead,372 but suggests that the
CAFC’s reasoning is not completely compelling. Contrary to the
approach advocated by Professor Anthony, the CAFC did not inquire
whether Congress had delegated authority to the Customs Service to
use rulings to set norms.373 Although the court correctly stated that
ruling letters do not set legal norms, it did not explain this
conclusion.374
Furthermore, although this Article agrees that the lack of
procedural safeguards or public participation would be a reason to
deny deference to a particular interpretive format, the existence of
procedural safeguards or public participation is not sufficient to
justify Chevron analysis. Consequently, this Article also questions the
portion of the CAFC’s reasoning in a footnote that leaves open the
issue whether Chevron analysis might be granted to customs rulings
issued after a notice-and-comment proceeding.375 The notice-andcomment proceeding to which the CAFC referred is required for a
366. See id. (“[T]his court also finds apt the Supreme Court’s analogy in Haggar
between trade and tax matters.”).
367. Id. (quoting Commissioner v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 336 n.8 (1995)).
368. See Mead Corp., 185 F.3d at 1307.
369. Id. at 1308.
370. See id. (noting, in contrast, that IRS revenue rulings all issue from the IRS’s
National Office and are published in the Internal Revenue Bulletin).
371. Id.
372. See id. (holding that Haggar, and thus Chevron deference, does not extend to
ordinary classification rulings).
373. See id. at 1307-08 (focusing on the procedural safeguards and public
participation). But see Anthony, supra note 20, at 44-46 (discussing the examination
of congressional intent in delegating authority).
374. See Mead Corp., 185 F.3d at 1307 (concluding, without authority, that
“Customs rulings do not carry the force of law.”).
375. See id. at 1307 n.1 (explaining that Mead did not involve such a ruling and
that the court took no position on the level of deference applying in such
circumstances).
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proposed interpretive ruling or decision which would either:
“(1) modify . . . or revoke a prior interpretive ruling or decision
which has been in effect for at least 60 days; or (2) have the effect of
modifying the treatment previously accorded by the Customs Service
to substantially identical transactions.”376 The legislative history of the
amendment which required notice-and-comment proceedings for
such rulings explains that the requirement ensures that “the Customs
Service will not unilaterally change the rules without providing
importers proper notice and an opportunity for comment.”377 The
sole purpose of the required notice-and-comment proceeding was to
prohibit the Customs Service’s prior practice of revoking prior
rulings and modifying past practices unilaterally and without notice.
Thus, there is no indication that Congress intended to accord a
customs ruling issued through this process greater legal weight than
other customs rulings.378
C. Other Possible Formats for Customs Interpretations
In addition to customs rulings, the administrative decisions and
practices of the Customs Service are found in various other formats.
To some extent, these other formats represent unexplored territory,
inasmuch as the recent customs cases addressing Chevron have
involved regulations or rulings.379 After regulations, rulings are the
format for which the strongest argument in favor of deference can be
376. 19 U.S.C. § 1625(c) (1994); see also Mead Corp., 185 F.3d at 1307 n.1 (stating
that such rulings go through notice-and-comment proceedings).
377. S. Rep. No. 103-189, at 64 (1993).
378. The conclusion regarding the notice-and-comment process under 19 U.S.C.
§ 1625(c) (1994) does not, of course, necessarily apply to all notice-and-comment
proceedings. One additional portion of the CAFC’s reasoning in Mead does not
appear to be completely accurate. The court stated that it would “adhere to its
precedent giving no deference to . . . [customs] rulings.” Mead Corp., 185 F.3d at
1307 (italics added). In fact, although prior cases had held that customs rulings were
not entitled to Chevron deference, they would, nevertheless, be given some weight in
accordance with the principle of Skidmore deference. If the CAFC intended to say
“no Chevron deference” when it said “no deference,” this objection would be
resolved. See also International Light Metals v. United States, 194 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir.
1999) (containing no indication that Customs sought deference to an interpretation
under the drawback laws); Texport Oil Co. v. United States, 185 F.3d 1291, 1294
(Fed. Cir. 1999) (“Customs has not asked this court to grant its proffered
interpretation . . . deference under the rule of [Chevron] . . . In these circumstances,
where Customs’ conspicuous silence raises the question of whether there is an
official ‘agenc[y] construction’ of the relevant statute, we decline to sua sponte extend
Chevron deference. We thus consider the parties’ arguments in this case without
formal deference.” (citations omitted)).
379. See United States v. Haggar Apparel Co., 526 U.S. 380, 395 (1999) (involving
a regulation); United States v. Levi Strauss & Co., 527 U.S. 1001 (1999) (involving a
regulation); Mead Corp. v. United States, 185 F.3d 1304, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
(involving a ruling).
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made. Therefore, the CAFC’s decision in Mead suggests that most
other interpretive formats would plainly not be entitled to Chevron
analysis.380 One may also note the CAFC’s 1992 decision in Travelstead
v. Derwinski,381 a non-customs case in which the Court ruled that an
agency’s interpretive guidelines are not entitled to Chevron analysis.382
Here, we briefly consider three non-ruling formats: “routine”
decisions at the port of entry, customs enforcement decisions, and
explanation of regulations at the time of promulgation.
1.

“Routine” decisions at the port of entry
As noted earlier, customs officials make a host of interpretations in
connection with the entry of merchandise.383 The importer may
contest the Customs Service’s action by filing a protest.384 When the
importer does not choose to seek “further review” by Customs
Headquarters, the protest will be addressed by local officials.385
Generally, the decision on the protest will be supported by only the
most rudimentary reasoning, such as a check mark in the “denied”
box and the explanation: “Original decision reviewed and found to
be correct.”386 Consequently, “there is often no written administrative
decision in individual customs transactions, [but] merely the customs
documents for the entry showing the value, classification, and rate of
duty.”387 In such situations, one “can fairly argue that there is no legal
interpretation that can be ascertained just from that . . . decision.”388
380. See Mead Corp., 185 F.3d at 1307 (holding that Customs rulings, unlike
regulations, should not receive deference).
381. 978 F.2d 1244 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
382. Id. at 1250 (“[A]gency pronouncements that are merely interpretive are
given lesser deference, varying with such factors as the timing and consistency of the
agency’s position and the nature of its expertise.”).
383. For example, customs officials must determine the value, classification, and
rate and amount of duty. See 19 U.S.C. § 1500 (1994). Additionally, customs officials
must ensure that the goods are properly marked with the country of origin. Id.
§ 1304. If a trademark was recorded with the Customs Service, Customs has the
authority to detain and even seize and infringing item. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1526,
1595a(c) (1994).
384. See 19 C.F.R. pt. 174 (1999).
385. See id. § 174.23-174.29 (providing that the protestant may in certain
circumstances request “further review” of a protest by Customs Headquarters but
that the protest will be acted upon by local officials in the absence of a request for
further review).
386. See id. § 175.25 (indicating that the Customs Service uses a form for protests,
Customs Form 19, that contains boxes to be checked by the Customs official
indicating the disposition of the protest).
387. REED , supra note 30, at 358.
388. Proceedings of the Ninth USCIT Judicial Conference, 161 F.R.D. 547, 645 (1994)
(comments of Carla Garcia-Benitez) (advocating Chevron deference where the
agency’s decision was supported by reasoned analysis); see also Simpson, supra note 28
(advocating Chevron analysis for Customs Service determinations other than “routine
tariff classification determinations”).
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In sum, routine decisions at the port of entry are not norm-setting
interpretations worthy of Chevron analysis.
2.

Penalty and other customs enforcement decisions
Customs penalty decisions389 are informal adjudications. Similar to
the interpretive rulings discussed above, penalty cases not resolved at
the local port are referred to Customs Headquarters. A body of
written administrative decisions in penalty cases is available to the
public containing the Customs Service’s interpretation of the statutes
implicated in penalty cases.390 However, a fundamental difference in
penalty matters is that judicial review in the CIT occurs in lawsuits
initiated by the government as plaintiff under the court’s jurisdiction
in 28 U.S.C. § 1582.391 In such cases, there is no presumption of
correctness attaching to the agency’s decision, and the government
bears the burden of proof. Apparently, the government has not
attempted to argue that statutory interpretations by the Customs
Service in a penalty case should be accorded Chevron analysis.
United States v. Menard, Inc.,392 in which the United States brought
an action for the collection of civil penalties, serves as an example of
the CIT’s independent statutory analysis in penalty cases. At issue was
a statutory provision providing for the restoration of duties owed to
the Customs Service.393 The question was whether duties could be
collected without regard to when the liquidation of the entry
occurred and without regard to the level of culpability of the
importer (in contrast to the provisions for civil penalties in which the
commencement of the limitations period depends on the level of
culpability).394 Although the court agreed with the Customs Service’s
interpretation, it did so after an independent analysis without
389. See 19 U.S.C. § 1592 (1994) (setting out the most common customs penalty
statute).
390. See 19 U.S.C. § 1625(a) (1994) (mandating that interpretive rulings be
published or made available to the public; although § 1625 does not specifically refer
to penalty decisions, as a practical matter, many penalty decisions are made available
to the public).
391. The more common setting for customs litigations occurs where an importer
contests a non-penalty decision by the Customs Service. The CIT exercises
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a) and the government must defend the agency’s
interpretation.
392. 795 F. Supp. 1182 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1992).
393. See 19 U.S.C. § 1592(d) (1994)
(Notwithstanding section 1514 of this title [19 U.S.C.], if the United States
has been deprived of lawful duties, taxes, or fees as a result of a violation of
subsection (a) of this section, the Customs Service shall require that such
lawful duties, taxes, and fees be restored, whether or not a monetary penalty
is assessed.).
394. See Menard, 795 F. Supp. at 1184 (summarizing defendant’s arguments).
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reference to Chevron analysis.395
3.

Explanations and interpretations of regulations
All the foregoing formats for agency interpretations of statutes
should be distinguished from agency interpretations of their own
regulations. Such interpretations are entitled to “controlling weight”
under Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co. unless they are “plainly
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”396 “Seminole Rock
adopts an approach to agency interpretations of regulations that, in
important respects, is quite similar to Chevron’s framework for
statutes.”397 Nevertheless, the two doctrines are separate. Chevron
established a system of analysis by which the agency interpretation of
a statute was viewed as a norm-setting act.398 Where the agency
interprets a statute (as in Chevron), the norm-setting act is legitimate
only when exercised pursuant to a congressional delegation.399 But
where the agency interprets its own regulation (as in Seminole Rock),
the agency’s historical familiarity as the drafter of the regulation is an
additional reason for deferring to the agency’s interpretation.400 The
fine distinction between Seminole Rock and Chevron appears to have
escaped the CAFC. In United States v. Federal Insurance Co.,401 the
CAFC cited Chevron in affirming the Customs Service’s interpretation
of a regulation which appeared in the agency’s explanatory notice in
the Federal Register when the regulation was promulgated.402 After
citing Chevron and taking into account the agency’s “long-standing
and consistent interpretation,” the CAFC sustained, as reasonable,
the Customs Service’s interpretation of the statute embodied in the
regulation and its contemporaneous explanation.403

395. See id. at 1187-88 (showing the court’s analysis of the statute and its ultimate
agreement with the Customs Service).
396. 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945).
397. Manning, supra note 161, at 627.
398. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 866 (1984) (sustaining the agency’s interpretation of the statute as set out in the
challenged regulations).
399. See id. at 843-44 (indicating that the power of an administrative agency may
rest upon an expressed or implicit delegation of authority).
400. See Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 401 U.S. 144,
153 (referring to the agency’s “historical familiarity” with its own regulation); Bowles
v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 417 (1945) (resolving any doubts about
the interpretation of the regulation by referring to a bulletin issued by the agency
concurrently with the regulation).
401. 805 F.2d 1012 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
402. See id. at 1017 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (stating that “a court must be particularly
circumspect in substituting its view of the statute for that of the agency” in reversing
the lower court’s “holding that the [agency’s] interpretation of 19 C.F.R. § 24.1(3)
was illegal”).
403. See id.
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More recently, in Princess Cruises, Inc. v. United States,404 the court
cited Chevron for the proposition that Customs interpretations of its
own regulations are entitled to “Chevron deference.”405 The CAFC’s
reference to Chevron in Princess Cruises and Federal Insurance, however,
is imprecise because the CAFC should have relied upon Seminole Rock
rather than Chevron.406
CONCLUSION
With the narrow holding of Haggar limited to legislative regulations
and its implications unclear, it is not surprising that the task of
reconciling Chevron analysis and de novo judicial review in the CIT
required the Supreme Court to agree to examine the subject again in
Mead. Customs litigants are being commanded, as were King Henry’s
troops, to charge “once more unto to breach” before the applicability
of Chevron analysis in customs litigation is determined.407
Haggar appears to have reaffirmed a rule already applied in
customs litigation which dictates that the validity of a customs
regulation will be determined under the two-step Chevron
methodology.408
If a regulation represents a reasonable
interpretation of an ambiguous customs statute, the CIT will sustain
the regulation and, having done so, will include it in the controlling
law which the court applies de novo to the facts found by the court.409
Where a regulation is not involved, we argue that Chevron analysis
has limited applicability in customs litigation. We believe that the
Supreme Court should affirm the CAFC’s decision in Mead for three
404. 201 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
405. Compare id. at 1357 (holding that Customs’ interpretation of an ambiguous
regulation that interpreted an ambiguous statute was entitled to “Chevron
deference”), with Seminole Rock, 325 U.S. at 414 (holding that an “[a]dministrative
interpretation [of its own regulation] . . . becomes of controlling weight unless it is
plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation”).
406. See Princess Cruises, 201 F.3d at 1357 (referring to Haggar and Chevron as
support for deference to Customs Service interpretations of its regulations); Federal
Ins. Co., 805 F.2d at 1017 (applying Chevron to support the agency’s interpretation of
its regulation). Cf. Seminole Rock, 325 U.S. at 413-14 (“Since this [case] involves an
interpretation of an administrative regulation a court must necessarily look to the
administrative construction of the regulation if the meaning of the words used is in
doubt.”); Lyng v. Payne, 476 U.S. 926, 939 (1986) (granting substantial deference to
agencies’ interpretations of their own regulations).
407. See CHRISTOPHER HIBBERT, AGINCOURT 55-72 (1964) (regarding the English
siege of Harfleur in 1415); Theodor Meron, Shakespeare’s Henry the Fifth and the Law of
War, 86 AM. J. INT’ L L. 1 (1992) (regarding legal aspects of the campaign).
408. See United States v. Haggar Apparel Co., 526 U.S. 380, 382 (1999) (“[T]he
Court of International Trade must, when appropriate, give regulations Chevron
deference”); see also supra notes 130-33 and accompanying text (proposing that
Haggar reaffirmed a rule limited to customs regulations).
409. See id. (applying this test in the holding).
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reasons. First, the customs laws are administered in a “splitenforcement” institutional framework, in which enforcement by the
administrative agency in the first instance is separated from de novo
adjudication of contested cases in the CIT. Deference to the agency’s
interpretation in the absence of a regulation would reject the
historical tradition of independent statutory interpretation exercised
by the adjudicatory component of the split-enforcement customs
regime. And since a customs ruling letter involves the application of
law to a specific set of facts, deference to the agency’s interpretation
set out in a ruling letter would undermine the CIT’s power to
conduct de novo review, a task that (as noted above) requires the
court to apply the controlling law de novo to the facts found by the
court.
Second, the general interpretive principle that tax statutes should
be construed in favor of the taxpayer is incompatible with according
deference to the agency’s interpretation in the absence of an explicit
delegation of law-making power to the agency for the specific format
at issue. Because classification, valuation, and duty assessment cases
arise under customs revenue statutes, the statutes are to be strictly
construed against the government and offer limited scope for “policy
judgments.” For the same reason, there are good reasons for
Congress to have separated the enforcement and adjudicatory
functions in Customs administration.
Third, under the customs revenue statutes, Congress does not
appear to have delegated authority to the Customs Service to set legal
norms in formats other than regulations. Because customs ruling
letters are not issued through a deliberative or adversarial process
typically provided in notice-and-comment regulations or formal, trialtype adjudications, the CAFC correctly held in Mead that customs
rulings are not an interpretive format that establishes legal norms to
which the CIT is to defer. Chevron analysis may apply, however, to
interpretations of non-revenue customs statutes if articulated in an
appropriate format. That question has not been specifically raised in
Mead, and it will be instructive to learn whether the Court’s reasoning
provides guidance or whether there will be a need for still further
litigation.410

410. See generally Manning, supra note 161 (analyzing the broader movement away
from deference to agency interpretations of law).

